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Jeffrey M. Anapolsky* and Jessica F. Woods** 
Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law for 
International Bond Investors 
Abstract 
This Article is a comparison of insolvency law in Brazil and the United 
States focusing on the perspective of international bondholders. It contains a 
discussion of Brazilian bankruptcy law reform, recognition of individual 
bondholders in reorganization proceedings, organizing creditors, debtor exclusivity, 
plan confirmation and voting rights, disclosure requirements, and asset sales. 
I. Introduction 
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the largest nation in South America and the 
fifth largest in the world by geography and population.1 As it prepares for the 2014 
World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, the Brazilian government is seeking nearly 
$500 billion to invest in roads, ports, dams, and other infrastructure projects.2 In 
addition, Brazilian corporations are issuing a record amount of bonds globally, 
regularly comprising about 50% of total global bond issuance for Latin American 
corporations (Chart 1).3 In 2012, Brazilian corporations issued a record $47 billion 
of bonds, up from $6 billion in 2008, and are expected to comprise over 50% of 
Latin American bond issuance in 2013.4 
  
 
© 2013 Jeffrey M. Anapolsky, Jessica F. Woods 
 * Jeffrey M. Anapolsky, JD/MBA, is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Maryland Francis King 
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 1. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BRAZIL, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013). 
 2. Brian Winter, Brazil’s Olympics Will Be Fine. As for the World Cup. . ., REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2012, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-brazil-olympics-odebrecht-idUSBRE87S10H20120829. 
 3. J.P. Morgan, Latin America: 2012 Review and 2013 Outlook (Jan. 2013), at 19; see infra Chart I. 
 4. See supra note 3. 
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While relatively high yields on Brazilian corporate debt appear attractive to 
international investors, these investors may assume that, in the event of default, 
Brazilian insolvency laws are similar to those in the U.S. In 2005, the Brazilian 
government replaced its outmoded insolvency laws with an entirely new regime, 
which bases its procedures for reorganization on chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code.6 This reform has led to several positive developments with respect to creditor 
recoveries in Brazilian corporate restructurings.7 However, there continue to be 
several noteworthy differences between the U.S. and Brazilian insolvency systems 
that may generate unwelcome surprises to U.S. holders of Brazilian corporate 
bonds, including discrepancies surrounding: (i) the recognition of individual 
bondholders’ claims;8 (ii) the ability of creditors to organize and retain legal and 
financial professionals;9 (iii) the process and timeline for negotiating, voting on, and 
confirming a plan of reorganization;10 (iv) the disclosure requirements for a 
debtor;11 (v) the procedure for selling the debtor’s assets;12 and (vi) the roles of 
courts and trustees in facilitating the insolvency process.13 Although investors may 
 
 5. J.P. Morgan, Latin America: 2012 Review and 2013 Outlook (Jan. 2013), at 21. 
 6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006); see also infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
 11. See infra Part VI. 
 12. See infra Part VII. 
 13. See infra Parts III–VII. 
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understand that Brazil is experiencing corporate delinquency rates approaching 
8.5% (Chart 2) as inflation remains around 5.5%,14 they may be overestimating 
their rates of recovery after their investments become distressed. In addition, they 
may not appreciate the out-of-pocket costs for professional fees and expenses as 
well as the time commitment necessary for negotiating with insolvent debtors. This 
Article will attempt to articulate some of the core differences between the U.S. and 
Brazilian insolvency laws that have an adverse effect on international bondholders 
and will suggest reform measures that would ameliorate these effects, thereby 
encouraging growth in the Brazilian debt capital markets and overall economy. 
 
II. Background on Brazilian Insolvency Law: 2005 Reform 
After more than a decade of legislative debate, the Brazilian government revamped 
its insolvency laws by enacting the Nova Lei de Falências e Recuperação de Empresas, 
Lei No. 11.101 (the “Brazilian Bankruptcy Law”) on February 9, 2005.16 The new 
law sought to modernize Brazil’s former insolvency statute, Decreto-Lei 7.661 
 
 14. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 1; see also infra Chart 2. 
 15. J.P. Morgan, Brazilian Large Cap Banks: A Recap of Recent Trends and Outlook 9 (May 2013); see also 
BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/localizarseries/localizarSeries.do?method= 
prepararTelaLocalizarSeries (last visited June 19, 2013). 
 16. Lei No. 11.101, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 (Braz.), 
translated in Turnaround Management Association do Brasil-TMA Brasil, Brazilian Bankruptcy Code (Feb. 9, 
2005), http://tmabrasil.org/en/articles-and-news/brazilian-bankruptcy-code. 
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(1945),17 which was highly criticized for stunting economic growth and contributing 
to interest rates that were among the highest in the world.18 The pre-2005 law 
involved alternative legal frameworks for reorganization (known as concordata)19 
and liquidation (bankruptcy or falência).20 However, distressed companies were 
rarely able to reorganize under the rigid concordata procedures, and, as a result, 
many potentially viable companies were forced into bankruptcy.21 Once in 
bankruptcy, procedural inefficiencies led to protracted cases,22 and successor 
liability discouraged the development of a meaningful market for the sale of assets 
in liquidation.23 Furthermore, the pre-2005 law prioritized claims in the following 
 
 17. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, de 21 de Junho de 1945, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 21.6.1945 
(Braz.) (repealed 2005), translated in http://www.translation-source.com/posts/brazilian-legislation-available-
in-english).  
 18. See, e.g., Joaquim de Paiva Muniz & Ana Tereza Palhares Basílio, The New Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, 16 
INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 225, 225 (2005) (“The inefficiency of [the prior] Brazilian insolvency rules ha[d] 
severe negative impacts on the economy, to the extent that they adversely affect[ed] the spread in the interest 
rates charged by financial institutions, which are among the highest in the world.”); see also GORDON W. 
JOHNSON & DANIEL ALONSO, IMPACT OF GLOBAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA: REEXAMINING THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST (Feb. 1, 2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ConferenceMaterial/ 
20168306/LA%20Corporate%20Insolvency%20(Johnson).pdf (explaining the importance of insolvency laws 
for a stable domestic economy and enumerating the shortcomings of Brazil’s former bankruptcy law). 
 19. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, tit. X. 
 20. Id. tits. I–IX. 
 21. In a concordata, the debtor’s repayment plan had to be one prescribed by the bankruptcy statute; any 
negotiation with creditors would result in any other creditor having the right to force the company into 
bankruptcy, regardless of the debtor’s financial condition. Id. art. 150. A concordata applied only to unsecured 
creditors. Id. art. 147. In its plan, the debtor could offer to pay its unsecured creditors either: 50% of its debt 
immediately, 60% over six months, 75% over 12 months, 90% over 18 months, or 100% over 24 months, in 
exchange for the full release of the debtor’s unsecured debt obligations. Id. art. 156. If the debtor submitted the 
proper documentation and its plan met these legal requirements, the judge granted the concordata; creditor 
consent was not at issue. Id. art. 161. If the debtor then failed to comply with the repayment plan, it was 
declared bankrupt. Id. art. 150. Because a company filing for concordata could rarely pay 50% of its debts 
upfront and negotiation between the parties was not permitted, often the concordata’s only effect was to 
postpone payments, resulting in high default rates despite the company’s potential viability. Aloisio P. Araujo et 
al., The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law Experience, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 994, 996 (2012); see also Luiz Fernando Valente de 
Paiva, Understanding the Intricacies of Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN 
SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING 
WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES 21, 24 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011), 
available at 2011 WL 586859. As a result, the former law was enormously unsuccessful at providing corporate 
debtors with a meaningful chance at reorganization. Indeed, 80% of companies in concordata were eventually 
declared bankrupt and liquidated. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 231. 
 22. Under the former regime, bankruptcy proceedings in Brazil took an average of 10 years, more than 
twice the average for Latin America. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, 225 n.2 (citing data gathered by economist 
Gesner Oliveira, former President of the Brazilian Antitrust Agency); see also Araujo et al., supra note 21, Fig.1, 
at 996. 
 23. Under the former regime, tax, labor, and other liabilities of an insolvent company were transferred to 
the buyer of an asset sold in liquidation. The full amount of such liabilities was generally not known or able to 
be estimated at the time of sale. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 24–25. Successor liability made the acquisition 
of a bankrupt company extremely unattractive to otherwise interested buyers, and depressed sale prices 
reflected this risk. See, e.g., Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 231 (explaining that “it was, in practice, unfeasible 
to transfer troubled business[es] to healthier entities”). In addition, successor liability led to disposal of the 
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order: (i) labor claims, (ii) tax claims, (iii) secured claims,24 and (iv) unsecured 
claims.25 Due to high labor and tax rates in Brazil, the debtor rarely had assets left 
over to satisfy secured creditors, let alone unsecured creditors.26 In most insolvency 
cases, secured creditors received nothing.27 As a result of these challenges, the 
average recovery rate under the prior insolvency regime for creditors who did not 
hold tax or labor claims was 0.2%, as compared with a 26% average creditor 
recovery rate for Latin America as a whole28 and a 43% historical average senior 
unsecured creditor recovery rate in the U.S.29 Investors demanded higher interest 
rates to account for this inordinate amount of risk, eventually motivating the 2005 
reform.30 
The 2005 reform sought to rectify many of these fundamental defects, and 
thereby improve Brazil’s credit market and overall economic health.31 To do so, the 
2005 reform introduced a legal framework for debtors to negotiate directly with 
creditors to restructure debts, eliminated successor liability,32 and demoted tax 
claims to a priority level below that of secured creditors.33 The 2005 reform replaced 
the concordata with two distinct methods of reorganization: recuperação judicial 
(judicial reorganization), which involves a court-supervised insolvency 
 
debtor’s assets in a piecemeal fashion, which generally translated to decreased proceeds and reduced recovery 
for creditors due to the loss of, for example, value in the form of goodwill. Id. at 230. 
 24. There are generally three types of secured claims in Brazil: mortgage (real property), pledge (personal 
property), and chattel mortgage (either real or personal property). See Thomas Felsberg, Rehabilitation and 
Composition Schemes in Brazil, in COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY ¶ 16.02[1][a] (Alan N. Resnick 
et al. eds., 2011). 
 25. Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, arts. 102, 124. 
 26. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 25 (“Because labor claims and tax claims are frequently enormous in 
Brazil, there were generally few assets remaining in a debtor’s estate to satisfy secured claims. As a result, 
Brazilian lenders incurred tremendous losses due to loan defaults in bankruptcy.”). See generally Christopher 
Andrew Jarvinen et al., The International Scene: Bankruptcy Reform Coming to Brazil, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 67, 
67 (2005). 
 27. Muniz & Basílio, supra note 18, at 230. 
 28. Araujo et al., supra note 21, at 996 (defining the Latin American and Caribbean block as including 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
for the purposes of this study). 
 29. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., RATINGS DIRECT: DEFAULT, TRANSITION, AND RECOVERY: U.S. 
RECOVERY STUDY: RECENT POST-BANKRUPTCY RECOVERY LEVELS DISAPPOINT SENIOR UNSECURED BONDHOLDERS 
3, 5 (2012), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_US/US_Recovery_Study_ 
Recent_Post_Bankruptcy_Recovery_Levels.pdf. 
 30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing high interest rates in Brazil); see also Araujo et al., 
supra note 21, at 996 (low creditor recovery rates in bankruptcy was “the main reason for the extremely high 
interest rate spread in Brazil before the new law”). 
 31. See Jarvinen et al., supra note 26, at 69 (discussing legislative intent behind the reform). 
 32. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 60, 141, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 33. Id. art. 83. In addition, the new law caps the priority position of creditors with labor-related or 
occupational accident claims at a value equivalent to 150 months of minimum wages per creditor; the 
remainder of such claims are considered unsecured. Id.; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[9][e]. 
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proceeding;34 and recuperação extrajudicial (extrajudicial reorganization), which 
involves an out-of-court insolvency proceeding.35 With respect to judicial 
reorganizations (the focus of this Article), the 2005 reform retained the concordata’s 
basic structure comprised of three creditor constituencies: labor creditors (Class I), 
secured creditors (Class II), and a catch-all class generally populated by unsecured 
creditors (Class III).36 The new law largely retained Brazil’s traditional framework 
for bankruptcy (falência), which is analogous to a chapter 7 liquidation in the U.S.37 
The new law also retained its pre-2005 concepts of fraudulent transfers, setoff, 
preferences, automatic stay, and discharge, which are somewhat similar to those 
found in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.38 
To initiate an insolvency proceeding, a debtor must file a petition with the 
Brazilian state civil court located in the jurisdiction of the debtor’s principal 
establishment.39 In addition, for a Brazilian insolvency proceeding involving bonds 
issued in the U.S., the debtor will likely need to initiate a chapter 15 proceeding in 
conjunction with its filing of a petition for judicial reorganization in order to gain 
U.S. recognition of the Brazilian court order.40 Brazilian creditors have a legal right 
to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding, but not a judicial reorganization proceeding.41 
Unlike in the U.S. where there are specialized federal bankruptcy courts in every 
jurisdiction,42 most Brazilian states direct insolvency petitions to a court of general 
subject matter jurisdiction.43 In such situations, which often occur outside the 
capital of São Paulo, the judge may be superficially familiar with insolvency law 
generally, have little experience with the 2005 reform, and have no experience with 
a complex business insolvency involving international bondholders. 
 
 34. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 161–67 (Braz.). 
 35. Id. arts. 47–69. Extrajudicial reorganization is conceptually similar to a prepackaged chapter 11 
proceeding in the U.S (though with many practical differences). Because extrajudicial reorganizations have been 
extremely rare since the 2005 reform, this Article will focus on the more common process of judicial 
reorganization. 
 36. Id. art. 41; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b]. It is worth noting that the debtor must submit tax 
liability clearance certificates before the judge may approve the reorganization plan. Lei No. 11.101, art. 57. 
Thus, in effect, the government is not subject to a judicial reorganization, because a reorganization plan can 
only be implemented if the debtor either has no tax liabilities or has negotiated an installment plan with the 
government. Id. art. 68. 
 37. Compare Lei No. 11.101, ch. V, with Decreto-Lei No. 7.661, tits. I–IX, and 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–84 (2006); 
see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.02[2][c], 16.03.  
 38. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[1][a], [7], [8], [9][i]. 
 39. Lei No. 11.101, art. 3; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[2], 16.04[2]. 
 40. Enacted in 2005, chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code covers ancillary and other cross-border cases. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–8, § 801, 119 Stat. 23, 
134–45 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32). 
 41. Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[3], 16.04[3] . 
 42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) (granting exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to federal district courts); 
see also Understanding the Federal Courts: Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/BankruptcyCourts.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (noting that 
each of the 94 federal judicial districts handles bankruptcy matters).  
 43. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[2]. 
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Once in judicial reorganization, the court appoints a judicial trustee44 to work 
with the debtor’s directors and officers, who remain in control of the business.45 The 
judicial trustee monitors the debtor’s operating activities, presides over the general 
meeting of creditors, provides summaries of the debtor’s books and records, and 
performs other administrative duties.46 
Thereafter, the debtor, its creditors, the judicial trustee, and the court must 
observe several milestones for judicial reorganization that are subject to a strict 
timeline as a matter of law.47 Chart 3 illustrates the overall timeline, which will be 
discussed in detail herein. 
 
 
 
Although the new law fails to address certain contemporary issues in insolvency 
law, such as cross-border insolvencies,49 the 2005 reform represented a giant leap 
 
 44. Lei No. 11.101, art. 22; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[2][a], [4][b]. 
 45. Lei No. 11.101, art. 64. However, officers and directors may be removed for cause. Id. 
 46. Id. art. 22; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[4][b]. 
 47. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 5, 7, 53–74 (providing the requirements and timeline for judicial reorganization). 
 48. Id.; see In re Varig, S.A., No. 05-14400 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2005); In re Independencia 
S.A., No. 09-10903 (SMB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009); In re Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. — Em 
Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568-scc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012); Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of 
Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012); Judicial 
Reorganization in Brazil, INDAPENDÊNCIA, http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/conteudo 
_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=25968 (last updated Nov. 13, 2009). 
Chart 3:  Judicial Reorganization Timeline48
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forward in modernizing Brazilian insolvency law. A 2012 empirical study led by 
Aloisio P. Araujo, Professor at the National Institute of Pure and Applied 
Mathematics in Rio de Janeiro, found that the overhaul led to a number of positive 
developments.50 The number of liquidation requests significantly decreased 
immediately following the reform, creditor recovery rates increased from 0.2% to 
17% by 2009, and the average time to close a business fell from 10 to 4 years.51 The 
same study also determined that the 2005 reform materially reduced the cost of 
debt financing due to the improved treatment of lenders52 and increased access to 
debt financing for Brazilian companies.53 Data from the Brazilian Central Bank 
(Chart 4) illustrates the following trends, which suggest that Brazilian companies 
and their creditors increasingly recognize the 2005 reform to be a constructive 
solution for corporate restructurings: (i) the number of judicial reorganizations is 
growing in absolute numbers as well as relative to the number of bankruptcies; (ii) 
for large businesses with revenues over 50 million Brazilian reais, which are most 
relevant to international bondholders, 2012 insolvency filings were comprised of 
approximately 80% judicial reorganizations and 20% bankruptcies (the proportion 
for small and medium businesses was approximately 35%/65% and 67%/33%, 
respectively); (iii) courts are most familiar with judicial reorganization cases 
involving small and medium businesses with revenues under 50 million Brazilian 
reais, but case law for large companies is steadily creating a foundation of applicable 
legal precedent; and (iv) the judicial reorganization process is resulting in more 
court-confirmed debt restructuring plans (as opposed to conversions to bankruptcy 
for liquidation), although the percentage remains consistently below 50%. 
Furthermore, a general rise in judicial reorganization filings since 2005 (Chart 4) 
suggests that Brazilian companies and their creditors are increasingly recognizing 
the 2005 reform to be a constructive solution for corporate restructurings.54 While 
the 2005 reform dramatically improved Brazilian insolvency laws, several aspects 
require further improvement to address practical capital market realities and 
conform to international best practices. 
 
 49. Brazil did not adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency endorsed by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997. Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.05[4]; see also Thomas 
Benes Felsberg & Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, Corporate Bankruptcy and Reorganization in Brazil: National 
and Cross-border Perspectives in NORTON ANN. REV. OF INT’L INSOLVENCY 275, 299 (2011) (urging Brazil to 
adopt laws regarding cross-border insolvencies). 
 50. Araujo et al., supra note 21, at 1000, 1004. 
 51. Id. at 996, 998. 
 52. Id. at 1004. 
 53. Id. at 995, 1004. 
 54. Indicador Serasa Experian de Falências e Recuperações, SERASA EXPERIAN, available at 
http://www.serasaexperian.com.br/release/indicadores/falencias_concordatas.htm (last accessed June 19, 2013).  
See, e.g., Felsberg & Filho, supra note 49, at 279 (“By recognizing that insolvency is first and foremost an issue to 
be resolved by debtor and creditors, the new law has become an efficient instrument to deal with many varied 
and complex situations and has been applied in numerous cases in a constructive manner. The number of cases 
that have been filed since the new law was enacted bears witness to the positive impact of the new law.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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 55.  Indicador Serasa Experian de Falências e Recuperações, SERASA EXPERIAN, available at 
http://www.serasaexperian.com.br/release/indicadores/falencias_concordatas.htm (last visited June 19, 2013). 
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III. Claim Separation 
The treatment of bondholders in a Brazilian insolvency case diverges sharply from 
the rights afforded bondholders under U.S. bankruptcy law. In the U.S., 
bondholders are considered individual creditors with separate voting rights and 
standing.56 An indenture trustee serves as a type of agent who is appointed to act on 
behalf of bondholders collectively, but its discretion to so act is limited by the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA)57 (when applicable), as well as the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code.58 These limitations prevent the indenture trustee from taking an active role in 
U.S. bankruptcy cases by, for example, voting on behalf of the bondholders for or 
against a chapter 11 plan of reorganization.59 Brazilian law, by contrast, treats a 
bond issue as a single creditor and therefore does not automatically recognize the 
preferences and opinions of individual bondholders.60 Instead, Brazilian law 
requires the bond issue to vote — or not vote — as a whole, either entirely for or 
entirely against a debt restructuring plan.61 Without the cooperation of the 
indenture trustee to vote on their behalf, bondholders in a Brazilian insolvency 
proceeding must go through the time-consuming and expensive process of 
separating their claims.62 When considering the cost of claim separation, individual 
bondholders should first determine how much voting power they can exert over 
Class III creditors if they were to successfully separate their claims. Even when some 
bondholders successfully separate their claims from the bond issue, bondholders’ 
overall influence in the case may be marginalized when the indenture trustee and 
large numbers of other individual bondholders do not participate. Further, it may 
be impossible even to identify large numbers of other bondholders to solicit their 
participation. 
 
 
Filings include requests submitted by potential debtors (requeridas for both bankruptcy and judicial 
reorganization) that were accepted by the court and ordered to be processed (decretadas for bankruptcy and 
deferidas for judicial reorganization). Small companies are defined as businesses with revenues up to 
BRL250,000; medium companies are defined as businesses with revenues between BRL250,000 and BRL50 
million; and large companies are defined as business with revenues over BRL50 million. Court-approved debt 
restructuring plans as a percentage of judicial reorganizations filings uses an average of the total judicial 
reorganization filings for the prior and current years. See id. 
 56. See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2006) (“The holder of a claim ... may accept or reject a plan.”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
3018(a) (explaining who may accept or reject a plan); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (“A creditor or an indenture 
trustee may file a proof of claim.”); see infra Part III.A. 
 59. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Peter J.M. Declercq, Restructuring European Distressed Debt: Netherlands Suspension of Payment 
Proceeding . . . The Netherlands Chapter 11?, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 396, 400–02 (2003) (contrasting the right to 
vote on reorganization plans in the Netherlands to indentured trustees’ rights to vote in United States). See 
generally Mark M. Polebaum et al., One Creditor or Many? Bondholder Standing in Foreign Insolvencies, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, May 2005, at 46; see infra Part III.B. 
 61. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
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A. Automatic Recognition of Individual Bondholders under U.S. Law and the Role of 
an Indenture Trustee 
The TIA, which supplements the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),63 governs 
the distribution of certain debt securities, such as public bonds. The TIA mandates 
the appointment of an independent, qualified trustee (known as an “indenture 
trustee”) to act for the benefit of all holders of a particular bond issue.64 An 
indenture is the contract that governs a bond issue65 and is accompanied by a 
registration statement that contains the details necessary for the bonds to be 
registered under the Securities Act.66 The indenture defines the relationship between 
an identified indenture trustee and the bondholders.67 Specifically, the indenture 
will describe the indenture trustee’s responsibilities and potential liabilities, as well 
as establish how bondholders can vote to instruct the indenture trustee to act.68 An 
indenture trustee’s administrative duties may include distributing interest and 
principal payments, monitoring redemptions, providing notice of default to 
bondholders, and filing a proof of claim on the bondholders’ behalf should the 
issuer enter bankruptcy.69 Beyond such administrative acts, the indenture trustee 
traditionally plays a passive monitoring role, even when the company defaults, an 
event that generally triggers ordinary fiduciary duties on the part of the indenture 
trustee.70 
 
 63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2006). 
 64. Id. § 77jjj(a)(1), (a)(4); id. § 77ooo(a)–(d). 
 65. Id. § 77ccc(7). 
 66. Id. § 77eee(a); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Debt Securities and Protection of Bondholders—The Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, 6 LAW SEC. REG. § 19.1 (2013).  
 67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77bbb, ooo. 
 68. Id. §§ 77bbb, ooo, ppp. 
 69. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture 
Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1044–49 (2008) (describing the typically “ministerial” duties of the indenture 
trustee that are set forth in the indenture). 
 70. Prior to default, indenture trustees generally do not owe fiduciary duties to bondholders except to the 
extent that they must avoid conflicts of interest. See id. at 1044–45; 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 470 (2d ed. 
2004). Instead, their pre-default obligations are defined by the terms of the indenture. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a)(1); 
see, e.g., Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1416 (3d Cir. 1993); Meckel v. Continental Resources Co., 758 F.2d 
811, 816 (2d Cir. 1985); BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of America, N.A., 778 F. Supp. 2d 375, 396 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The question is whether [the indenture trustee] performed its express duties under the 
contract, and [the indenture trustee] is strictly liable for any breach of these duties as a matter of basic contract 
law.”). But see AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 11 N.Y.3d 146, 156–57 (N.Y. 
2008) (noting that some courts have found indenture trustees to owe a pre-default “extracontractual duty to 
perform basic, nondiscretionary, ministerial functions redressable in tort if such a duty is breached”). Post-
default, however, the TIA introduces a heightened standard of care, requiring the indenture trustee to exercise 
“the same degree of care and skill . . . as a prudent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the 
conduct of his own affairs.” 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c). In addition, U.S. courts have generally held that an event of 
default triggers ordinary fiduciary duties on the part of the indenture trustee. See Gresser v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. CCB-12-987, 2012 WL 5250553, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2012) (“[A] broad, fiduciary-like duty to 
protect noteholder interests seems to be what the TIA intended to vest in indenture trustees during defaults.”); 
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 520, 527–28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“[S]ubsequent to 
the obligor’s default . . . it is clear that the indenture trustee’s obligations come more closely to resemble those of 
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Due to uncertainty surrounding their role and duties in a chapter 11 case,71 
indenture trustees often act in a manner that prioritizes minimizing liability for 
themselves over advocating the best interests of the bondholders.72 For example, 
they may refuse to act without approval by a majority of bondholders, so as to fit 
within the TIA’s safe harbor for actions taken “in good faith in accordance with the 
direction of [a majority of] the holders . . . .”73 
Furthermore, the indenture trustee’s role in a chapter 11 case is limited by both 
the TIA and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The TIA prevents “all binding bondholder 
votes that would modify any core term — principal amount, interest rate, and 
maturity date — of a bond indenture.”74 This provision thus prohibits the indenture 
trustee from voting on any proposed plan of reorganization that would alter the 
principal, interest, and maturity of a non-consenting bondholder. The U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code also prevents the indenture trustee from voting on a plan of 
reorganization. Because the Bankruptcy Code limits those entitled to vote on a plan 
of reorganization to “holder[s] of a[n allowed] claim or interest”75 and defines 
“claim” as a “right to payment,”76 courts have held that “it is the beneficial holder 
 
an ordinary fiduciary, regardless of any limitations or exculpatory provisions contained in the indenture.”). 
However, due to ambiguity in the TIA and case law surrounding the extent of such post-default duties, 
indenture trustees are often uncertain of their role in a bankruptcy case, leading them to be wary of taking any 
action that could lead to future liability. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1040 (“Although a 
prudent-man standard is widely used and well-developed in other legal contexts, it has received scant attention 
in the trust-indenture context. Indenture trustees for defaulted bonds therefore face the conundrum that they 
are required to act prudently but lack clear guidance on what prudence means.”). 
 71. See supra note 70. 
 72. Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1041–43 (explaining this phenomenon and advocating application 
of the business judgment rule in the trust-indenture context as a solution). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d)(3); see also Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1046; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 1126.02[2], at 1126-6 n.15 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (“As a practical matter 
indenture trustees do not exercise powers not granted to them in their enabling indentures and generally a 
trustee will not undertake a trust where such language might be present. The standard indenture gives an 
indenture trustee the right only to file a proof of claim, but not to vote, for the bondholders or debenture 
holders.”); Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, The Role of the Indenture Trustee in Reorganization 
Cases Under the Bankruptcy Code, 102 BANKING L.J. 436, 440 (1985) (“Beyond [the TIA’s authorization for the 
indenture trustee to file proofs of claim], however, the TIA does not mandate that any specific discretionary 
powers be exercised by the indenture trustee ‘as a prudent man . . . under the circumstances’ of a reorganization 
case.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 232 
(1987) (referring to the requirements of the Trust Indenture Act § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2006)); see 
also George W. Shuster, Jr., The Trust Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 431, 437 (2006) (“Section 316(b) was adopted with a specific purpose in mind—to prevent out-of-court 
debt restructurings from being forced upon minority bondholders.”). But see 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(2) 
(indenture may contain provisions authorizing the indenture trustee to postpone interest payments for a 
maximum period of three years with the consent of the holders of at least 75% in principal amount of the 
indenture securities). 
 75. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2006); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 3018 (“[A]n equity security holder or creditor 
whose claim is based on a security of record shall not be entitled to accept or reject a plan unless the equity 
security holder or creditor is the holder of record of the security on the date the order approving the disclosure 
statement is entered or on another date fixed by the court, for cause, after notice and hearing.”). 
 76. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). 
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[i.e., the individual bondholder], not a holder of record (i.e., the indenture trustee), 
who has the ‘claim’ and the ‘right to payment,’” and, thus, the right to vote on a 
plan of reorganization.77 Thus, while preventing indenture trustees from voting on 
behalf of bondholders, U.S. bankruptcy law automatically recognizes each 
bondholder as an individual creditor who is authorized to vote its respective claim 
separately.78 
B. Lack of Automatic Recognition of Individual Bondholders and the Necessity of 
Pursuing Claim Separation under Brazilian Law 
In contrast, Brazilian law treats a debtor’s bond issue as a single claim, thus denying 
individual bondholders the automatic voting rights they enjoy under the U.S. 
system. Instead, Brazilian Bankruptcy Law expects the indenture trustee to express 
the voices of all bondholders, by rendering it the only party capable of acting on 
their behalf.79 For certain actions, such as filing a proof of claim on behalf of all 
bondholders within the fifteen-day deadline in a judicial reorganization, this 
expectation is reasonable.80 In other instances, however, the onus on the indenture 
trustee conflicts with its conventional role, which, as discussed, is characterized by 
an inability to vote on a plan of reorganization in a U.S. chapter 11 case81 or modify 
central terms of an indenture (such as principal, interest, and maturity) absent the 
consent of affected bondholders,82 and a reluctance to act where discretion is 
permitted absent majority approval to shield it from liability under the TIA’s safe 
harbor.83 Moreover, the likelihood of gaining consensus among bondholders — 
 
 77. In re Pioneer Fin. Corp., 246 B.R. 626, 633 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000); In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). 
 78. See, e.g., In re Shilo Inn, Diamond Bar, LLC, 285 B.R. 726, 730 (Bankr. D. Or. 2002) (discussing the 
relationship between the issuer, indenture trustee, and bondholders and explaining that bondholders “are like 
holders of promissory notes evidencing debt of the issuer corporation . . . . [T]he indenture trustee is not the 
holder of the claim and, accordingly, is not entitled to accept or reject a plan. The bond holders are entitled to 
vote their own claim or interest”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 79. In this regard, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law likens the indenture trustee to its Brazilian counterpart — 
the fiduciary agent (agente fiduciário) — established under the Brazilian Corporation Law to represent 
bondholders and whose enumerated duties (unlike the indenture trustee) include representation of 
bondholders in bankruptcy proceedings. Lei No. 6.404, arts. 66 (appointment), 68 pará. 3(d) (duties), de 15 de 
dezembro de 1976, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 15.12.1976 (Braz.). 
 80. Lei No. 11.101, art 7 pará. 1, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.); see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16.03[9][a][iii], 16.04[7][a][iii] (“The time limit for creditors to file 
their claims or submit their opposition to the debts listed by the debtor is 15 days. If the creditor fails to file his 
claim during such period, the claim may be subsequently admitted as a late claim. In such case, the creditor will 
have no voting rights in the general meeting of the creditors.” (footnote omitted)). In U.S. bankruptcies, 
indenture trustees routinely file a proof of claim on behalf of all bondholders pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 
3003. FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 3003(c)(5); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77qqq(a)(2) (2010) (authorizing indenture trustee 
to “file such proofs of claim and other papers or documents as may be necessary or advisable in order to have 
the claims of such trustee and of the indenture security holders allowed in any judicial proceedings”). 
 81. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  
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who are made up of multiple institutions and perhaps hundreds of individuals, each 
with unique priorities, interests, and decisionmaking processes — is remote. 
Indeed, it may be impossible, as a practical matter, to communicate with a sufficient 
number of bondholders to induce the indenture trustee to act (e.g., a majority), 
much less to garner votes from the requisite 100% of those affected in order to 
participate in acceptance or rejection of a plan.84 Thus, the convergence of the U.S. 
and Brazilian legal frameworks seriously impedes individual bondholders’ ability to 
participate in a Brazilian judicial reorganization. In addition, it may create disputes 
between U.S. bondholders and their indenture trustee. 
If bondholders wishing to participate in a Brazilian judicial reorganization face 
an indenture trustee who refuses to act on their behalf, they may attempt to 
separate their individual claims from the claim of the bond issue by filing a proof of 
claim with the judicial trustee within fifteen days of public notice of the case.85 Once 
separated, bondholders gain the rights of a creditor to vote on a debt restructuring 
plan at the general meeting of creditors. Although claim separation is not explicitly 
laid out in the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, Brazilian courts have authorized 
bondholders to obtain individual recognition under the court’s general power to 
admit or alter claims.86 To actually separate their claim so as to gain voting rights, 
however, bondholders must go through a time-consuming, expensive, and 
convoluted process of filing cumbersome and labor-intensive forms to prove their 
ownership.87 For institutions that manage many separate funds and accounts, each 
fund and account must fill out separate forms that explain and prove its identity, 
legal status, and authorization in extensive detail.88 Fund managers may require 
burdensome cooperation from their clients to gather this information, including a 
power of attorney, by-laws, certificate of incorporation, certificate of incumbency, 
and management agreement. Each form must be properly consularized,89 notarized, 
sworn, and translated into Portuguese.90 Any mistake or omission may disqualify 
 
 84. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1547–49 (2001) 
(describing the complexity of the indirect holding system used in U.S. and global securities markets). 
 85. Lei No. 11.101, art. 7, pará. 1. 
 86. Id. art. 39; see, e.g., Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 
0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012) (approving the claim separation of Barclays 
Bank PLC, Nomura Securities International, Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. and other individual 
bondholders). 
 87. Lei No. 11.101, art. 7, pará. 1, art. 9. 
 88. See generally id. 
 89. A document is deemed consularized when executed before and notarized by a foreign notary. José 
Henrique Lamensdorf, Almost Everything You Wanted to Know About Certified (Sworn) Translations in Brazil, 
http://www.lamensdorf.com/br/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 90. See Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, The Legal Framework for Cross-Border Insolvency in Brazil, 32 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 97, 140–41 (2009) (explaining that foreign creditors in Brazilian bankruptcy cases face 
bureaucratic obstacles to efficiently solving cross-border cases due to the 1973 Brazilian Code of Civil 
Procedure’s requirement that all foreign documents be officially translated into Portuguese for recognition in 
court). 
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the application, causing the bondholder further delay, at which time critical 
deadlines may have passed.91 
Proving ownership of bonds in a modern world of online transactions can be 
especially challenging. Debt capital markets transactions regularly rely on electronic 
information provided by the Depository Trust Company (DTC), but such digital 
evidence is inadequate for Brazilian courts considering claim separation.92 The 
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires “financial instruments and documents that 
legitimize the claims [to] be submitted in the original or by certified copies if 
attached to other proceedings.”93 The DTC annually settles over US$1 quadrillion in 
securities transactions throughout 120 countries in which investors rely on the 
integrity of its data.94 Nevertheless, Brazilian law does not acknowledge such 
realities; instead requiring documentation to which bondholders may not have 
prompt access. This antiquated level of detail may embolden a debtor to file 
frivolous objections regarding a bondholder’s claim separation application in order 
to create strategic delays in the expedited insolvency process.95 
Moreover, even if bondholders are able to separate their claims successfully in 
order to gain voting rights in a Brazilian insolvency proceeding, their voting power 
may be inconsequential to the overall vote of Class III creditors. Since the indenture 
trustee will likely abstain from voting for non-separated bondholders, only the 
separated bondholders’ voices will be heard.96 Without aligning with other similarly 
situated creditors, bondholders with separated claims will likely face an uphill battle 
to negotiate a favorable outcome for bondholders overall. Accordingly, the debtor 
may cater to other creditor groups with more influence on the outcome of the 
proceeding, such as labor or tax creditors.97 
C. Claim Separation in Practice 
In practice, claim separation can become a time-consuming, costly distraction for 
international bondholders who could otherwise focus on the debtor’s operational 
performance, prospects for selling the company’s assets to one or more acquirers, 
 
 91. See Lei No. 11.101, art. 7 pará. 1, art. 19. 
 92. Article 9 of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law enumerates the documentation that a creditor must submit 
in a proof of claim, which includes documents evidencing the claims. Id. art. 9(III).  
 93. Id. art. 9, pará. único. 
 94. About DTCC: Our Business, DTCC (2012), http://www.dtcc.com/about/business/. The DTC is a 
subsidiary of the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. See About DTCC: Subsidiaries & Joint Ventures, The 
Depository Trust Company (DTC), DTCC (2012), http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/dtc.php. 
 95. The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law permits the debtor or any creditor to file an opposition to any claim, 
alleging lack of a claim or challenging its lawfulness, amount, or rating. Lei No. 11.101, arts. 8, 13. The 
bondholder must then file an answer, attaching any additional evidence considered necessary. Id. art. 11. An 
opposition creates a separate case record, which must be decided by the judge who may order an evidentiary 
and judgment hearing if necessary. Id. arts. 13, 15. 
 96. Id. art. 45 (only the votes of creditors who are represented at the general meeting count towards 
obtaining the requisite percentage of assenting creditors for plan approval). 
 97. See Paiva, supra note 21. 
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and establishing alliances with bank lenders and other creditors. A recent example 
of these challenges is the 2012 Brazilian insolvency case involving Centrais Elétricas 
do Pará S.A. (CELPA). In June 2011, CELPA issued US$250 million of 10.5% notes 
due 2016 to qualified institutional buyers in accordance with Rule 144A of the U.S. 
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and outside the United States in accordance 
with Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended.98 After paying one 
coupon in December 2011, on February 28, 2012, CELPA suddenly filed for judicial 
reorganization before the Thirteenth Civil Court of Belém in Pará, Brazil.99 At the 
time of CELPA’s filing, eight institutional investors, all of whom wished to 
participate in the reorganization proceedings, held approximately 45% of the 
bonds.100 Repeated efforts to identify the other 55% of the bondholders via the DTC, 
underwriters, listing exchange, trading exchange, clearinghouses, and 
advertisements were unsuccessful. With only 45% of holders providing direction, 
the indenture trustee refused to take action for fear of being held liable to 
undiscovered holders who could later sue the indenture trustee for taking action 
without first obtaining majority or unanimous approval, as the case may be.101 
Without the indenture trustee’s support, CELPA’s bondholders were 
immediately confronted with the issue of claim separation following the 
commencement of the judicial reorganization. In order to be heard on issues before 
the court and to get the debtor’s attention in negotiations, the bondholders needed 
to establish individual standing in the case via claim separation. The eight 
institutional bondholders represented approximately 39 individual funds and 
accounts with respect to CELPA bonds.102 After weeks of preparing claim separation 
 
 98. Latin America: Brazil, TROUBLED CO. REP., Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://bankrupt.com/ 
TCRLA_Public/120319.mbx. 
 99. Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 
(13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See discussion regarding role of U.S. indenture trustee in insolvency proceedings supra Part III.A. 
 102. Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 
(13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 2012) (approving the separation of claims of Thornburg Investment Income 
Builder Fund; Thornburg Strategic Income Fund; TRP SICAV Global Emerging Markets Corporate Bond Fund; 
Sumitomo Trust Emerging Markets Bond Mother Fund; TRP Global Emerging Markets Bond Fund (DSBI 
Global Investment Trust); Nordea 1 Emerging Market Corporate Bond Fund; John Hancock Funds II - 
Spectrum Income Fund; T. Rowe Price Fixed Income Trust; T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond Fund; T. 
Rowe Price Institutional Emerging Markets Bond Fund; T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond Trust; T. Rowe 
Price Strategic Income Fund, Inc.; Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt Opportunities Fund PLC; FTIF - 
Templeton Global High Yield Fund; Franklin Global Trust - Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt 
Opportunities Fund; Franklin Templeton Emerging Market Debt Opportunities (Master) Fund Ltd.; FT 
Opportunistic Distressed Fund, Ltd.; Pennsylvania Public Employee’s Retirement System; The JBUT Master 
Investment Partnership, LLP; The Harry L. Bradley Jr. Trusts Master Investment Partnership LLP; John 
Hancock Investors Trust; John Hancock Strategic Income Fund; John Hancock Fund II Strategic Income Fund; 
John Hancock Trust Strategic Income Trust; Kentucky Retirement Systems Pension; Manulife Am Strategic 
Income Pooled Fund; Manulife Emerging Markets Debt Fund; Manulife Global Emerging Market High Yield 
Fund; Manulife Strategic Income Fund (159); Public Employees Retirement of New Mexico; Moneda Deuda 
Latinoamericana Fondo De Inversión; Moneda Retorno Absoluto Fondo De Inversion; Moneda Absolute 
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forms for each fund and account, their counsel submitted the applications to the 
court.103 Seeing an opportunity to gain an advantage in negotiations, CELPA’s 
counsel objected to the claim separation in order to silence the voices of 
bondholders.104 Nearly 20 weeks after the commencement of CELPA’s judicial 
reorganization, the court ruled in favor of bondholders, approving the claim 
separation.105 CELPA’s counsel then appealed this ruling to create further delay and 
to gain additional negotiating leverage.106 Weeks later, the appellate court affirmed 
the claim separation. CELPA’s counsel again appealed to maintain its perceived 
advantage.107 While ultimately the bondholders were able to vote on CELPA’s debt 
restructuring plan, the debtor’s delay tactics distracted the bondholders throughout 
nearly the entire 180-day time period for the judicial reorganization. 
D. Potential Solutions 
These issues could be ameliorated by amending the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law such 
that bondholders’ claims are recognized as independent from that of the bond issue. 
It is difficult to imagine who would be prejudiced by such a change, and, with little 
to no cost to other parties to the judicial reorganization, the benefit to bondholders 
would be significant. Bondholders could focus their efforts on negotiating a fair and 
equitable plan rather than on separating their claims. In addition, it would be 
constructive to amend the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law to loosen the technical 
requirements of proving claim ownership by recognizing the DTC’s record as 
sufficient for that purpose. 
Alternatively, these issues could be resolved by amending the TIA for future U.S. 
bond issuances involving foreign issuers from countries like Brazil.108 First, the TIA 
 
Return Fund; Moneda Latin America Corporate Debt Fund; and Fondo Larraín Vial Renta Fija 
Lationoamericana FI). 
 103. Id. (approving the motion for claim separation of Barclays Bank PLC, Nomura Securities International, 
Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. and other individual bondholders). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Interlocutory Appeal Nomura Securities International, Inc., State Court of Appeals of Pará State 
(case no. 2012.3016.5917); Interlocutory Appeal J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., State Court of Appeals of Pará 
State (case no. 2012.3016.5909); Interlocutory Appeal Bondholders, State Court of Appeals of Pará State (case 
no. 2012.3016.5925); Interlocutory Appeal Barclays Bank PLC, State Court of Appeals of Pará State (case no. 
2012.3016.5933). 
 107. Supra note 106. 
 108. Academics have criticized the TIA for inhibiting the indenture trustee’s ability to effectively advocate 
the best interests of bondholders. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1042 (“These deficiencies in the 
post-default governance of public bond issues by indenture trustees contrast unfavorably with the increasingly 
sophisticated post-default behavior of lenders on private debt. Although it is possible that these private-lender 
actions may benefit public bondholders, the interests of private lenders are by no means perfectly aligned with 
the interests of bondholders. Frequently, private lenders and public bondholders are competing creditors, such 
as when the bonds are subordinate to the company’s other debt. Bondholders then may need an effective 
indenture trustee to protect their rights, especially since aggressive bargaining by private lenders can 
systematically advantage them over the public bondholders.”) (footnotes omitted); accord Marcel Kahan, The 
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could authorize an indenture to provide for a lower threshold than the affirmative 
vote of 100% of those affected by a proposal, such as a simple majority, for directing 
the indenture trustee to modify central terms of an indenture such as principal, 
interest, and maturity in an insolvency proceeding. A lower threshold would 
acknowledge the practical reality that it is rarely possible to locate every single 
bondholder, especially in the 180-day timeframe of a Brazilian judicial 
reorganization. 
Second, when calculating whether the threshold has been reached for taking 
action in insolvency proceedings, the TIA could authorize indentures to provide 
that only bondholders who indicate direction should be counted, assuming 
adequate notice to all bondholders was given beforehand. For example, in the 
CELPA case where only 45% of bondholders were ever located, a unanimous 
direction by these bondholders would satisfy a 100% threshold if the unknown 
bondholders were excluded. This approach also acknowledges the practical reality 
that it is rarely possible to locate every single bondholder and, accordingly, uses a 
unanimous vote of the known bondholders as a proxy for the remaining 
bondholders. 
Third, the TIA could authorize the indenture trustee to act in the best interests 
of bondholders in the absence of direction by 100% of bondholders.109 The TIA 
already includes a prudent man standard for governing the actions of an indenture 
trustee.110 The indenture could refer to this standard when authorizing the 
indenture trustee to negotiate with a debtor and other creditors, object to motions 
of the debtor, and cast a vote approving or denying a debt restructuring plan in a 
Brazilian judicial reorganization. Empowering the indenture trustee with this 
authority would motivate the indenture trustee to act in order to avoid potential 
liability from inaction. 
 
 
 
 
Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 569 (1995). These structural 
disadvantages between public bondholders and private lenders in U.S. cases are exacerbated when foreign 
bondholders face local banks in an insolvency proceeding outside of the U.S. Local banks are likely to have 
closer ties with the local management, owners, and directors of local debtors than foreign bondholders. 
Moreover, local banks are more likely to do business with local debtors after the insolvency proceeding is 
resolved; whereas foreign bondholders are more likely to try to sell their investments as soon as the insolvency 
proceeding concludes. Furthermore, the advisors of local banks are more likely to have preexisting relationships 
with the local debtor’s advisors although foreign bondholders can try to hire well-connected local advisors as 
well. Finally, local banks are more likely to have local government connections than foreign bondholders. 
 109. See, e.g., Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 69, at 1041–43 (advocating application of the business judgment 
rule in the trust-indenture context to protect indenture trustees from liability when acting on behalf of 
bondholders in a bankruptcy case). 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (2006). 
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IV. Organizing Creditors in an  
Insolvency Proceeding 
There are many reasons why similarly situated creditors should organize when 
confronted with the insolvency of a common borrower. Most importantly, united 
creditors can negotiate the best overall outcome by focusing on maximizing the 
value of the debtor’s assets. As a result of joining forces, creditors can resist a 
debtor’s efforts to divide and conquer by pitting some creditors against others. 
Organized creditors can share costs for professional advisors to assist in negotiation, 
litigation, appraisals, and, if necessary, liquidation. They can also work together to 
disseminate information and minimize fraud, misrepresentation, and self-dealing 
by the debtor. Finally, organized creditors can speak with one voice to the debtor in 
order to streamline negotiations and create a more efficient process. 
A. Creditors’ Committees Under U.S. Law 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires the U.S. trustee to appoint an official 
committee of unsecured creditors to represent the interests of all general unsecured 
creditors, including bondholders.111 The trustee may use its discretion to appoint 
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders,112 though multiple 
committees are not typical.113 The U.S. trustee selects which creditors will serve as 
members of the committee of general unsecured creditors (as well as other 
committees, if any) at a meeting of all creditors held soon after the filing of the 
bankruptcy case.114 In general, the trustee will appoint the creditors holding the 
seven largest claims against the debtor to serve on the committee.115 However, the 
committee should include membership from many categories of unsecured claims 
(e.g., senior bondholders, subordinated bondholders, trade creditors, 
union/employee creditors, and unsecured bank lenders) in order to be 
representative of all interests.116 Service on a committee is entirely voluntary.117 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code authorizes the committee to perform certain tasks in 
connection with the bankruptcy case.118 These tasks include: consulting with the 
 
 111. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006).  
 112. Id. § 1102(a)(1)–(2). 
 113. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1102.02[4][a] (“The United States trustee should 
appoint additional committees only if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors. In the vast 
majority of chapter 11 cases, a single committee of creditors should be sufficient and multiple committees will 
be the exception rather than the rule.”) (footnote omitted). 
 114. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a)–(b)(1); FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 2003. 
 115. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). In the case of a committee of equity holders, the committee will generally 
consist of the equityholders holding the seven largest amounts of equity securities of the debtor. Id. § 
1102(b)(2). 
 116. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1102.02[b][i]. 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1)–(2). 
 118. Id. § 1103; see also H. PETER NESVOLD ET AL., THE ART OF DISTRESSED M&A: BUYING, SELLING, AND 
FINANCING TROUBLED AND INSOLVENT COMPANIES 37 (2011). 
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debtor concerning case administration; investigating the conduct and financial 
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business, and the desirability 
of the continuance of the business; participating in the formulation of a plan, as 
well as collecting and filing with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan; 
requesting the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee or examiner; and performing 
such other services as are in the interest of those represented.119 In addition, the 
Bankruptcy Code explicitly gives the committee standing to be heard by the 
bankruptcy court on any issue.120 
To aid in its performance of these tasks, the committee, with the bankruptcy 
court’s approval, may employ attorneys, accountants, and other professional 
advisors, such as investment bankers, appraisers, and turnaround consultants.121 
These advisors’ reasonable fees and expenses are not paid by the committee or the 
creditors that they represent; rather, such costs are paid directly by the debtor 
following court approval.122 
B. Creditors’ Committees Under Brazilian Law 
Although the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law also provides for the formation of a 
creditors’ committee during a judicial reorganization,123 this committee is very 
different from an official committee of unsecured creditors formed pursuant to the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The establishment of a creditors’ committee in Brazil is not 
mandatory and is relatively rare. A committee may be established upon the 
resolution of any class of creditors at a general meeting of all creditors, which takes 
place during the initial stages of a judicial reorganization.124 At the general meeting, 
the creditors are rigidly divided into three classes, regardless of the amount of their 
claims or the number or diversity of creditors in each class: (1) labor creditors 
(Class I), (2) secured creditors (Class II), and (3) and a catch-all class generally 
populated by unsecured creditors (Class III).125 Each class votes for a creditor (as 
well as two alternates) to serve as its representative on the committee.126 A creditors’ 
committee thus consists of one elected representative from each class of creditors 
and represents the interests of all creditors, not just those of unsecured creditors.127 
Brazilian law does not provide a formal way for bondholders and other unsecured 
 
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c). 
 120. Id. § 1109(b). 
 121. Id. § 1103(a); see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 173. 
 122. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). 
 123. Lei No. 11.101, art. 26, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (composition of committee of creditors consists of one representative from each class and is formed 
by resolution at the general meeting); see also id. art. 44 (specifying that only members of class may vote for its 
representative). 
 127. Id. art. 26.  
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creditors to organize separately, creating a significant disadvantage for international 
bondholders. When a committee is not formed at the general meeting, the judicial 
trustee (or the judge in the event that the judicial trustee has a conflict of interest) is 
responsible for fulfilling the duties that would otherwise be assigned to the 
committee.128 
When formed, creditors’ committees face certain duties under Brazilian law.129 
These duties include, inter alia: supervising the activities of the debtor in judicial 
reorganization or the judicial trustee in bankruptcy; in the case of a judicial 
reorganization, submitting a report on the debtor’s activities every thirty days; 
monitoring the case proceedings and ensuring legal compliance; informing the 
judge upon the discovery of any violation of the rights or injury to the interests of 
creditors; verifying and issuing an opinion on any complaints by interested parties; 
requesting that the judge call general meetings of creditors; and supervising the 
performance of a debt restructuring plan.130 Importantly, however, fees and 
expenses incurred by the committee in its performance of these duties (e.g., the cost 
of employing legal counsel and other professional advisors) are not automatically 
paid for by the bankruptcy estate.131 Instead, the committee must request 
reimbursement from the judge, which “shall be [made] in accordance with available 
cash funds.”132 In addition, committee members may be held liable for any losses to 
the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, or the creditors caused by the committee’s malice 
or negligence.133 
These aspects of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law have negatively impacted the 
importance and competence of creditors’ committees in insolvency cases. While the 
creditors’ committee in a U.S. bankruptcy case constitutes a critical platform for 
unsecured creditors to advance their interests, the creditors’ committee under the 
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law is rarely established and — when established — replete 
with conflicts of interest that diminish its value. 
1. Creditors’ Committees Rarely Established 
Due to the expenses and potential liability associated with serving on a Brazilian 
creditors’ committee,134 few creditors are willing to do so. As a result, a creditors’ 
committee is rarely established.135 Luiz Fernando Valente de Paiva, a Brazilian 
 
 128. Id. art. 28. 
 129. Id. art. 27. 
 130. Id.; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.03[4][c]. Noticeably absent from this list are any tasks related 
to helping to formulate the plan of reorganization that will ultimately be presented to the creditors for a vote. 
 131. Lei No. 11.101, art. 29. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. art. 32. Any members who disagree with a committee resolution must state their dissent in the 
committee minutes to avoid liability. Id. 
 134. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.  
 135. See, e.g., Alexandre Couto Silva, Complying with the Changing Environment of Brazilian Bankruptcy 
Law, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE 
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bankruptcy practitioner, professor, and member of the final drafting committee for 
the 2005 law, has called for amendments to the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law that 
would include compensation for professional advisors to the committee and the 
members’ release of liability for negligence, noting that “[w]ithout these changes, 
the creditors’ committee will continue to be an entity existing only on paper and in 
the imagination of the lawmaker.”136 Paiva’s view is in line with the 
recommendations of the World Bank, set forth in its Principles and Guidelines for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, which explains the important role 
fulfilled by a creditors’ committee as “provid[ing] ‘double protection’ for creditors, 
giving them the ability to participate in and monitor the proceedings” and urges 
that insolvency laws provide for the compensation of professional advisors from the 
bankruptcy estate to help the committee fulfill this function.137 The failure to 
establish a formalized vehicle for creditors to organize creates serious issues 
concerning transparency, cohesiveness among creditors, and judicial 
administration.138 Furthermore, without a committee, the court and judicial trustee 
are burdened with addressing a fragmented body of creditors, as well as carrying 
out tasks that would otherwise be assigned to the committee.139 
Without a committee to utilize as a vehicle for coordinating efforts, unsecured 
creditors must seek information, monitor the case, and challenge questionable 
behavior individually. Clearly, many creditors will lack the resources to do so, while 
others may not have a sufficient stake in the outcome to make individual action 
worthwhile. From a law and economics perspective, individual decision-making can 
lead to suboptimal results as compared to collective action. Fernando César Nimer 
Moreira da Silva, a Brazilian economist, has used game theory to illustrate that 
when a non-homogeneous, unorganized group of creditors make rational decisions 
 
SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL 
STRATEGIES 175 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 586872; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 31 
(“With the enactment of the [2005 law], . . . it was expected that the creditors would be able to participate 
actively in overseeing the process by means of a creditors’ committee. This has not come about, given the 
creditors’ refusal to assume the post due to the responsibilities that may be imposed on them.”). 
 136. Paiva, supra note 21, at 31. 
 137. WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
paras. 102, 107 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf (“Consistent with the 
committee’s role in monitoring the proceedings and representing the voice of creditors (at least unsecured 
creditors), the committee must have access to impartial advice to ensure that the rights of creditors are being 
protected. For this reason, the law should allow creditors to retain an independent professional who will be 
compensated from the estate or from the proceeds distributed to the creditors represented by the committee.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 193 (“The creditors’ committee gives transparency, security, 
reliability, and efficiency to the process as desired by the creditors. Without the creditors’ committee, the 
success or failure of the reorganization seems to be difficult.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 193 (“The failure to timely constitute the creditors’ committee can 
create a great imbalance in the roles of the persons involved in the process of bankruptcy and reorganization, 
imposing heavy burdens to the courts and to the trustee by overloading them with activities not related to their 
crafts, which can be highly complex to them. . . . Furthermore, creditors end up taking their individual and 
disorganized actions to the court, disrupting and delaying the process, which generates endless discussions 
through request.”). 
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on an individual basis, their decisions often do not maximize gains for creditors as a 
whole.140 Rather, advancement of the collective interest of creditors depends on their 
ability to organize under the rules of the game.141 Silva explains that the lack of 
organization exacerbates problems related to inadequate disclosure from the 
debtor142 and creates inter-creditor communication barriers, leading to inefficient 
outcomes — i.e., the liquidation of potentially viable companies or the 
unwarranted reorganization of failed ones.143 He cites the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, 
which he notes does not provide for the efficient organization of creditors,144 as an 
example of this phenomenon.145 
2. Conflicts of Interest Diminish the Value of Creditors’ Committees 
The composition of members serving on a creditors’ committee formed under the 
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law — which includes one representative from each of the 
three classes of creditors146 — is also problematic. Due to their respective levels of 
priority, the interests of each class of creditors are inherently in conflict. With 
inherently conflicting interests among members, the committee could rarely, if ever, 
act as a cohesive body. Indeed, it is difficult to find a purpose in joining such 
representatives into a collective entity. Whereas the primary purpose of a 
committee established pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is to maximize 
returns for its constituency,147 the purpose of a committee made up of members 
where a gain to one generally necessitates a loss to another is unclear. Recognizing 
this issue, the World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems recommends that “care . . . be taken to avoid potential 
conflicts of interests of interests on the committee.”148 The Principles further state: 
As a general rule unsecured creditors committees should consist only of 
unsecured creditors. In some cases a committee of secured creditors might be 
justified. . . . Often, secured creditors have little in common with unsecured 
creditors, and their ability to participate in and alter the outcome of 
decisions by the committee may be inappropriate and not in the best interest 
 
 140. FERNANDO CÉSAR NIMER MOREIRA DA SILVA, INCENTIVOS Á DECISÃO DE RECUPERAÇÃO DA EMPRESA EM 
CRISE: ANÁLISE Á LUZ DA TEORIA DOS JOGOS pts. III.1, III.3.1 (2009) (faculty of law dissertation, University of 
São Paulo), available at http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-18112009-093516/pt-br.php 
 141. Id.  
 142. See infra Part VI.C. 
 143. See SILVA, supra note 140, at pts. III.1, III.3.1. 
 144. See SILVA, supra note 140, at 63 n.201 and accompanying text.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Lei No. 11.101, art. 26, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 147. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 16.03[4][c]. 
 148. See WORLD BANK, supra note 137, at 33, para. 105. 
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of other creditors. By nature, the interests of secured creditors conflict with 
those of unsecured creditors.149 
3. Organizing Creditors in Practice 
For these reasons, international bondholders involved in the recent Brazilian 
judicial reorganizations of CELPA and Independência S.A.150 did not organize 
themselves through creditors’ committees. Both cases, however, experienced the 
creation of ad hoc committees of bondholders outside of the formal insolvency 
process. Each of these ad hoc committees retained legal advisors. The Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law provides that any expenses incurred by creditors in order to 
participate in a judicial reorganization cannot be enforced against the debtor, and 
there is no exception for ad hoc committees.151 However, an ad hoc committee may 
be able to negotiate with a debtor to reimburse its fees and expenses via a non-
debtor affiliate, such as another company controlled by the same family that owns 
the debtor’s equity. The debtor agreed to such an arrangement in the 
Independência case, but the debtor in the CELPA case did not.152 When the debtor 
does not agree, the members of the ad hoc committee may have to pay for the fees 
and expenses of their attorneys, investment bankers, and other advisors themselves.  
Rather than trying to organize disparate creditors, it may prove more effective 
for international bondholders to buy the claims of local creditors, such as those of 
Brazilian banks, to gain greater voting control for themselves. However, 
bondholders may be reluctant to invest fresh capital in a distressed situation where 
 
 149. Id.; see also id. at 33, para. 104 (“The committee serves as a voice for all unsecured creditors and should 
be representative.”). 
 150. On February 27, 2009, Independência S.A., a Brazilian beef processor based in the state of São Paulo, 
filed for judicial reorganization before the Lower Civil Court of Cajamar in São Paulo, Brazil. See BDO 
INTERNATIONAL, INDEPENDÊNCIA S.A. (IN JUDICIAL RECOVERY/REORGANIZATION): FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR 
THE 9 (NINE) MONTH PERIODS ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 2009 AND 2008 AND LIMITED REVIEW REPORT 4 (2009), 
available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/3Q09%20Financial%20Statements 
%20anort.pdf. Previously, Independência had issued US$300 million of 9.875% Notes due 2015 and US$225 
million of 9.875% Notes due 2017. See Press Release, Independência S.A., Independência Commences Consent 
Solicitation and Cash Tender Offer For Its 9.875% Notes Due 2015 and 9.875% Notes Due 2017 (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://ir.independencia.com.br/independencia/web/arquivos/Notice%20to%20the%20Market%2-
%20Independ%EAncia%20commences%20consent%20solicitation%20and%20cash%20tender%20offer.pdf. 
 151. Lei No. 11.101, art. 5(II). 
 152. Despite failing to gain the debtor’s acquiescence, the ad hoc committee of bondholders in the CELPA 
case was ultimately able to convince the acquirer and indenture trustee to reimburse a majority of their 
professional fees and expenses during the chapter 15 process that followed the judicial reorganization. See In re 
Centrais Elétricas do Para S.A., No. 12-14568 (SCC) at ¶ 14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (order granting 
recognition of Brazilian main proceeding and certain related relief and providing for payment of ad hoc 
committee’s professional fees and expenses). As a result of the U.S. court’s order, the ad hoc committee received 
reimbursement of approximately 85% of their fees and 100% of their expenses. Centrais Eletricas: Brazilian Plan 
Approved in U.S., TROUBLED CO. REP. LATIN AM. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://bankrupt.com/TCRLA_Public/ 
121220.mbx (noting that the ad hoc bondholder group received as much as $1.2 million in professional fees and 
expenses). 
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they have already experienced losses. They may be faced with an uncomfortable 
decision: invest more or lose more. 
V. Negotiating, Voting On, and 
 Confirming a Plan of Reorganization 
The dissimilarities in how creditors are organized in the U.S. and Brazil have a 
direct impact on how plans are negotiated, voted on, and confirmed. There are 
many differences between a plan of reorganization in the U.S. and a debt 
restructuring plan in Brazil besides the former being written in English and the 
latter in Portuguese. Several aspects of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law – in particular, 
non-terminating debtor exclusivity and the negotiation and voting processes – 
create serious challenges for creditors navigating the insolvency process and can 
lead to poor outcomes for international bondholders. 
In both the U.S. and Brazil, certain types of creditors are expressly exempt from 
a corporate debtor’s ability to discharge its debts, but the exemptions differ.153 In 
Brazil, exempt creditors include “a creditor holding the position of fiduciary owner 
of real or personal property, financial lessor, owner or committed seller of real 
estate whose respective agreements include an irrevocability or irreversibility clause, 
including under real estate developments, or an owner under a sale agreement with 
title retention . . . .”154 In addition, since a Brazilian debtor must submit tax liability 
clearance certificates before the judge may approve the reorganization plan,155 a 
judicial reorganization can only be implemented if the debtor either has no tax 
liabilities or has negotiated an installment plan with the government.156 
A. Debtor Exclusivity Under U.S. Law 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants the debtor the exclusive right to file a plan of 
reorganization during the first 120 days of the bankruptcy case.157 The filing of a 
plan within that period automatically triggers a “solicitation period,” which 
provides another 60 days of exclusivity for the debtor.158 Because the debtor can 
easily file a placeholder plan, which need not be confirmable, within the initial 120-
day timeframe, debtor exclusivity in the U.S. is commonly thought of as lasting 180 
days.159 
 
 153. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (2006). 
 154. Lei No. 11.101, art. 49 pará. 3. 
 155. Id. art. 57. 
 156. Id. arts. 57, 68. 
 157. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). This period of time is known as the “exclusivity period.” NESVOLD ET AL., supra 
note 118, at 335–39. 
 158. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). 
 159. Id. § 1121(c)(3). 
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Any party in interest may request an extension or reduction of the debtor’s 
exclusivity and solicitation periods.160 The moving party has the burden of 
demonstrating cause to support its request, which the court may grant after notice 
and a hearing.161 Cause to extend may be demonstrated by explaining the burdens of 
organizing the company’s financial affairs, the time-consuming process of assessing 
its strategic alternatives, and the difficulties of negotiating with various creditor 
constituencies.162 Cause to shorten may be very difficult to prove.163 Multiple 
extensions are routinely requested and granted in complex chapter 11 cases, which 
describes many corporate bankruptcies, while motions to shorten are rare and often 
denied.164 
If the debtor has not obtained acceptance of the plan by the expiration of the 
combined exclusivity and solicitation periods, the debtor’s exclusivity terminates, 
and any party in interest165 may thereafter file a plan of reorganization.166 Permitting 
limited exclusivity for the debtor to propose a plan of reorganization reflects a 
legislative intent to balance the relative power of the debtor and its creditors.167 
 
 160. 11 U.S.C. §1121(d)(1). 
 161. Id.; see In re Borders Grp., Inc., 460 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he 
burden of proving cause to reduce or increase exclusivity is on the moving party”). However, “[s]ection 1121 
was designed, and should be faithfully interpreted to limit the delay that makes creditors the hostages of 
Chapter 11 debtors.” In re Curry Corp., 148 B.R. 754, 755 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting United Savings 
Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 484 U.S. 365 (1988)). 
 162. See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (listing factors used by 
courts to determine whether cause exists to extend exclusivity). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Grand Traverse Dev. Co., 147 B.R. 418, 420–21 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (rejecting 
evidence presented to reduce the exclusivity period). As a result, rather than focusing on exclusivity, a secured 
creditor who has lost confidence in the debtor’s management will more often seek to lift the automatic stay in 
order to seize its collateral, appoint a bankruptcy trustee, or convert the case to a chapter 7 liquidation. 
 164. In exercising its broad discretion for whether to grant a motion to extend or shorten exclusivity, a 
bankruptcy court may consider a variety of factors to assess the totality of circumstances in each case. See In re 
Borders Grp., Inc., 460 B.R. at 821–22 (“The determination of cause under section 1121(d) is a fact-specific 
inquiry and the court has broad discretion in extending or terminating exclusivity.”); In re Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp., 352 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (identifying objective factors courts historically have 
considered in determining whether cause exists to extend or terminate exclusivity); see also In re Dow Corning 
Corp., 208 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (identifying factors used by courts to determine whether 
cause exists to extend exclusivity); In re Express One Int’l, Inc., 194 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) (same); 
In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same). 
 165. A “party in interest” includes: “the debtor, the trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security 
holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). 
 166. Id. 
 167. The House Committee Report attached to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code states, with respect to section 
1121: “The exclusive right [to propose a plan] gives the debtor undue bargaining leverage, because by delay he 
can force a settlement out of otherwise unwilling creditors, and they have little recourse except to move for 
conversion of the case to [liquidation]. . . . Proposed chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in 
control to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill until it would be too 
late for them to be an effective remedy. At the same time, the bill recognizes the legitimate interests of creditors, 
whose money is in the enterprise as much as the debtor’s, to have a say in the future of the company.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 95–595, at 6191 (1978); see also In re Lake in the Woods, 10 B.R. 338, 340–41 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) 
(describing the legislative history behind section 1121 and quoting this House Committee Report at length). 
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In 2005, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to limit the permissible length of 
extensions to the debtor’s exclusivity and solicitation periods in response to 
concerns that bankruptcy proceedings were taking too long and that advisors had 
an adverse incentive to prolong negotiations in order to accumulate excessive fees.168 
Today, the 120-day exclusivity period cannot be extended beyond 18 months from 
the petition date,169 and the 180-day combined exclusivity and solicitation periods 
cannot be extended beyond 20 months from the petition date.170 Limiting the 
debtor’s exclusivity period works to the benefit of secured creditors, who can 
pressure the debtor to expeditiously create a viable strategy to fix the company or 
else surrender collateral. Debtors must now address strict time limits for creating a 
plan of reorganization and obtaining sufficient favorable votes from creditors for 
confirmation.171 Previously, debtors could threaten creditors by endlessly extending 
the exclusivity period with the approval of sympathetic judges.172 
B. Debtor Exclusivity Under Brazilian Law 
While exclusivity is not an explicit part of Brazilian insolvency law, the structure of 
judicial reorganization results in exclusivity for the debtor throughout the entire 
process.173 When a petition for judicial reorganization is accepted by the court, the 
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law establishes a 180-day stay of creditors’ actions against the 
debtors’ assets.174 During this period, only the debtor can propose a plan and solicit 
support from creditors.175 Absent plan confirmation, this non-extendable stay 
terminates automatically, converting the case to bankruptcy (liquidation).176 
Within the 180-day stay, the debtor must observe interim deadlines. The debtor 
must submit its plan to the court within 60 days of publication of the decision 
granting the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization.177 This 60-day period is 
 
 168. See H.R. REP. NO. 109–31(I), at 55 (2005) (“Section 411 amends section 1121(d) . . . to mandate that a 
debtor’s exclusive period for filing a plan may not be extended beyond a date that is 18 months after the order 
for relief in the chapter 11 case.”). 
 169. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A). 
 170. Id. § 1121(d)(2)(B). 
 171. See generally id. § 1121. 
 172. See, e.g., In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., No. 04-45814-JWV, slip op. (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2007) 
(granting eighth extension such that the debtor retained exclusivity for approximately 42 months); In re United 
Airlines, Bk. No. 02-48191-ERW, slip. op. (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 20, 2005) (granting request for extension such 
that the debtor retained exclusivity for approximately 35 months). 
 173. Lei No. 11.101, art. 5, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 174. Id. art. 6, pará. 4. 
 175. Id. art. 53. 
 176. See Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[1] (“The debtor will be declared bankrupt during the judicial 
restructuring proceedings if any of the following events occur: (1) the creditors’ general meeting does not 
approve the restructuring plan; (2) the debtor fails to submit the restructuring plan within the sixty day time 
period provided for in article 53 of the bankruptcy law; or (3) the debtor fails to fulfill the terms of the approved 
judicial restructuring plan.”). 
 177. Lei No. 11.101, art. 53. 
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non-extendable, and failure to timely submit a plan also results in conversion to 
bankruptcy (liquidation).178 
Unlike under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s exclusivity under the 
Brazilian Bankruptcy Law never terminates so as to give creditors an opportunity to 
propose competing plans.179 While creditors may propose amendments to the 
debtor’s plan at the general meeting of creditors that is convened for voting, any 
modifications to the plan require the express consent of the debtor.180 
C. Confirming a Plan Under U.S. Law 
The basic objective of every chapter 11 case is to achieve confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization.181 Confirmation can be accomplished through consensual 
confirmation, which involves obtaining acceptance of the plan from all impaired 
classes of creditors or interest holders, or nonconsensual confirmation (popularly 
known as “cramdown”), which permits confirmation notwithstanding rejection of 
the plan by one or more classes.182 
For voting and treatment purposes, a plan of reorganization must separate 
claims and interests into various classes.183 Each claim or interest may only be 
included in a particular class if it is “substantially similar” to the other claims and 
interests of such class.184 In general, classification is determined based on priority 
and the nature of the security interest, if any. Thus, the plan will usually create a 
separate class for each secured creditor,185 as well as each unsecured creditor granted 
priority status under the Bankruptcy Code.186 The plan will typically group all 
 
 178. Id. art. 73. 
 179. Id. art. 53. 
 180. Id. art. 56; see also discussion infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.  
 181. See NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 333. 
 182. See infra notes 197, 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 183. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (2006). Certain unsecured claims granted priority under the Code need not be 
classified, including claims described in sections 507(a)(2) (administrative expense claims), (a)(3) (involuntary 
gap claims), and (a)(8) (unsecured tax and custom duties claims). The Code exempts these claims from the 
classification requirement because “a specific majority of claimants with such priorities cannot bind a member 
of the class to less favorable treatment than that provided in section 1129(a)(9).” COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 
supra note 73, ¶ 1122.03[b]. 
 184. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). Subsection 1122(b) makes an exception for relatively small unsecured claims, 
which a plan proponent may classify as a single class with court approval for the purpose of administrative 
convenience. Id. § 1122(b).  
 185. Unless, for example, certain claims are secured by the same collateral and have equivalent priority. 
 186. The Code grants priority to certain categories of unsecured claims set forth in section 507. 11 U.S.C. § 
507. In addition the court may grant priority to postpetition loans under section 364. Id. § 364. 
Priority claims under subsections 507(a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), and (10) should be separately 
classified because such claims are not substantially similar to either general unsecured claims or secured 
claims. In addition, because each of these categories of priority claims differs from the others in priority 
rank, the claims in a particular category must be placed in a separate class if impaired under the plan. 
For example, if the plan proposes to pay [one category] in deferred cash payments [under 
1129(a)(9)(B)] and [another] in full on the effective date of the plan, the section 507(a)(4) and section 
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general unsecured creditors (e.g., bondholders), who are entitled to a pro rata share 
of the debtor’s assets after payment of secured claims and other priority claims, into 
a single class.187 Finally, the plan will generally provide for a class consisting of equity 
interests, which may be separated further according to the nature of the interest 
(e.g., common versus preferred stock).188 
All individual holders of allowed claims and interests may vote on a plan of 
reorganization.189 However, voting is tabulated by class, not by the individual 
holders of claims or interests. Thus, a class may accept a plan of reorganization, 
without having the unanimous consent of its members.190 To achieve acceptance of 
a particular class, the plan must receive a sufficient percentage of favorable votes 
from the members of such class. For each class of creditors,191 a plan is accepted if it 
receives the favorable vote of members holding at least two-thirds in amount and a 
majority in number of the allowed claims.192 Creditors cast votes via mail-in ballot 
and only class members that actually vote count in determining whether the 
requisite majorities in number and amount are met. Importantly, classes receiving 
full recoveries under a plan of reorganization are considered “unimpaired” and are 
 
507(a)(7) claims may not be in the same class . . . . However, it is most common for plans to include in 
the same class any claims entitled to priority under section 507(a), other than subsection 507(a)(2), 
(a)(3), and (a)(8), and to provide that such claims be fully paid in cash on the effective date of the plan. 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1122.03[b]. 
 187. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1122.01. However, numerous other factors may affect the 
interests of certain members of a class, warranting their separate classification. For example, section 510(a) 
provides that subordination agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a). Therefore, courts 
have permitted the separate classification of senior and subordinated debt, even though the holders of both 
claims qualify as general unsecured creditors. See In re Reid Park Properties, LLC, No. 4:11-bk-15267-EWH, slip 
op. at 3–4 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2012) (requiring that senior secured debt be classified separately from senior 
subordinated debt). Courts have also permitted the separate classification of union claims from other general 
unsecured claims, finding the union’s interests to be unique given the demand for a future relationship with the 
debtor. See In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Storage Lighting Co., Inc., 149 B.R. 306, 307–09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (creating a separate classification for labor union claims). While courts may allow the plan proponent to 
create additional classes based on reasonable distinctions among claims, attempts to “gerrymander” claims to 
create a sympathetic impaired class that will vote in favor of a plan of reorganization will usually generate 
vigorous objections and are largely rejected by courts. See NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 359. 
 188. See Acceptance of the Plan of Reorganization, http://bankruptcy.uslegal.com/chapter-11-bankruptcy/ 
acceptance-of-the-plan-of-reorganization (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the different classes of claim 
holders). 
 189. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 1126(a). The bankruptcy court may temporarily allow unresolved claims — i.e., 
those that are disputed or unliquidated — for the purposes of voting on a plan of reorganization. Further, the 
bankruptcy court may disallow the vote of any holder whose acceptance of rejection of the plan was not in good 
faith or whose vote was not procured or solicited in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1126(e). 
 190. Id. § 1126. 
 191. As opposed to a class of interest holders other than creditors, such as equity holders, who accept a plan 
if it receives the favorable vote of members holding at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests. Id. § 
1126(d). 
 192. Id. § 1126(c). 
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conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan.193 Conversely, classes receiving no 
recoveries under the plan are deemed to have rejected it.194 The holders of claims or 
interests in either situation do not need to go through the mechanics of actually 
voting. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the 
bankruptcy court may disqualify any acceptance or rejection that was not made or 
solicited in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code.195 
Consensual confirmation occurs when all classes of creditors accept a proposed 
plan of reorganization.196 In particular, consensual confirmation requires every 
“impaired” class to have affirmatively voted to accept the plan.197 A class is 
considered impaired “if the plan alters the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to 
which the holders of such claims are otherwise entitled, unless the only alteration is 
the reinstatement of the original maturity and curing defaults with respect to an 
accelerated debt.”198 Because unimpaired classes are conclusively presumed to have 
accepted the plan,199 whether a class is considered impaired determines which classes 
must vote to accept the plan in order to satisfy confirmation requirements.200 
Important additional requirements of confirmation include the best interests test, 
which guarantees that each individual creditor or interest holder will receive at least 
as much pursuant to the plan of reorganization as it would if the debtor were to be 
liquidated under chapter 7,201 and the feasibility test, which requires a finding that 
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need 
for further financial reorganization, of the debtor . . . .”202 
If the plan proponent cannot obtain acceptance of the plan by each and every 
impaired class, then the plan proponent may request nonconsensual confirmation, 
or cramdown.203 Cramdown incorporates all of the criteria for consensual 
confirmation, except the requirement that all impaired classes affirmatively vote to 
accept the plan.204 Instead, cramdown requires affirmative acceptance of the plan by 
at least one impaired class, without regard to any acceptance by an insider.205 
Further, cramdown involves two additional requirements: (1) that the plan not 
 
 193. Id. § 1126(f). 
 194. Id. § 1126(g). 
 195. Id. § 1126(e). 
 196. Id. § 1129(a). 
 197. Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
 198. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1124.02; see 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1)–(2) (2006). 
 199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 200. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring that each class either accept the plan or be unimpaired). 
 201. Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 202. Id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 203. See id. § 1129(b) (setting forth the procedure for “cramdown”). 
 204. Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 205. Id. § 1129(a)(10). As a result, impaired classes remain critical to the overall confirmation process 
whether the case involves consensual confirmation or cramdown, and negotiations between the plan proponent 
and the impaired class(es) and its advisors will usually be the most contentious. 
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discriminate unfairly against impaired classes that have rejected the plan, and (2) 
that the plan treat such classes fairly and equitably.206 
D. Confirming a Plan Under Brazilian Law 
Under the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, once the court grants the debtor’s petition for 
judicial reorganization, the debtor has sixty days to submit a debt restructuring plan 
to the court.207 Failure to meet this deadline will result in conversion of the case to 
bankruptcy (meaning, liquidation).208 The plan must contain a detailed description 
of the means of reorganization to be used, a statement of its economic feasibility, 
and a professionally appraised report on the debtor’s assets.209 The Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law provides a list of the means of reorganization that the debtor may 
invoke, which include, inter alia, the granting of special terms and conditions for 
the repayment of debt, spin-off, merger or consolidation, share assignment, change 
in control, capital increase, succession or lease, payment in kind, and sale of the 
company’s assets.210 
Once the debtor submits a plan, the judge orders public notice of the plan to 
advise creditors of its contents.211 Creditors then have 30 days to object to the plan.212 
If no one objects, then the judge must grant the judicial reorganization and the plan 
is put into effect.213 If any creditor objects, the judge must call a general meeting of 
creditors to discuss the plan, alter it, and approve or reject a final plan.214 The 
meeting must be held within 150 days after the debtor’s petition for judicial 
reorganization was granted.215 Although the judge sets the timing of the general 
meeting and provides notice of the meeting,216 the judge does not preside over this 
assembly, which does not take place in the courtroom. Instead, the judicial trustee 
manages the meeting.217 The debtor may be invited to make a presentation on its 
proposed debt restructuring plan to the creditors in attendance. 
At the general meeting, the creditors are divided into the following three classes: 
(1) creditors with labor-related claims (Class I), (2) secured creditors (Class II), and 
 
 206. Id. § 1129(a)–(b). The Bankruptcy Code's condition that a plan be fair and equitable for the purposes 
of cramdown includes requirements known as the “absolute priority rule” that address the priority of payments 
to holders of secured claims, unsecured claims, and equity interests.  Id. § 1129(b). 
 207. Lei No. 11.101, art. 53, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 208. Id. arts. 53, 73. 
 209. Id. art. 53. 
 210. Id. art. 50. 
 211. Id. art. 53. 
 212. Id. art. 55. 
 213. Id. art. 58. 
 214. Id. arts. 36, 56. 
 215. Id. art. 56. 
 216. Id. art. 36. 
 217. Id. art. 37. 
 Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law 
428 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
(3) a catch-all class generally populated by unsecured creditors (Class III).218 At first 
call, the general meeting must have in attendance creditors holding over half of the 
claims of each class in order to convene.219 Thereafter, there is no quorum 
requirement.220 Creditors at the meeting have the option of voting on the plan or 
adjourning to continue negotiations.221 Multiple adjournments are common.222 The 
plan may only be altered with the express agreement of the debtor,223 and any 
alteration must not exclusively decrease the rights of absent creditors.224 The final 
plan must be approved by all three classes of creditors.225 With respect to Classes II 
and III, the plan must be approved by creditors representing over half of the total 
value of the claims present at the meeting, as well as by a simple majority of the 
individual creditors present.226 With respect to Class I, the plan must be approved by 
a simple majority of the individual holders of labor-related claims present, without 
regard to the amount of their claims.227 For purposes of calculating voting 
thresholds, all foreign currency claims are converted into Brazilian reais at the 
exchange rate prevailing on the day before the general meeting.228 Unlike in the U.S., 
creditors may not vote by mail; rather, they must be present at the general meeting 
in order to have their votes counted.229 Creditors may be represented at the general 
meeting by proxy or legal representative, provided that they deliver to the judicial 
 
 218. Id. art. 41. 
 219. Id. art. 37, pará. 2. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Creditors may choose to adjourn the general meeting in order to avoid voting to reject the debt 
restructuring plan because such rejection could cause the judicial reorganization to convert to bankruptcy. 
Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[1] (“The debtor will be declared bankrupt during the judicial restructuring 
proceedings if . . . the creditors’ general meeting does not approve the restructuring plan.”).  
 222. Paiva, supra note 21, at 31 (due to the lack of coordination among creditors, “there have been judicial 
reorganizations in which over twenty general meetings were held, with countless adjournments, for the 
negotiations to be concluded”). For example, in CELPA’s judicial reorganization, the first call for the general 
meeting of creditors was on July 9, 2012, the second call was on August 3, 2012, and the third and final call was 
on September 1, 2012, which was the 180th day of the proceeding. See Minutes of General Meeting of Creditors 
attached to the main case records for the Judicial Reorganization Proceedings of Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A., 
13th Lower Court of Belém, State of Pará, No. 0005939-47.2012.8.14.0301 (13th L.C. Belém, Pará Feb. 29, 
2012). 
 223. As noted, the debtor maintains the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization throughout the 
judicial reorganization proceeding. See supra Part V.B. Creditors have no right to file their own plan; rather, 
they may only propose amendments to the debtor’s plan. Because “no modification may be adopted over an 
objection of the debtor . . . judicial restructuring requires the debtor’s cooperation and consent.” Felsberg & 
Filho, supra note 49, at 280–81. As a result, if creditors want a plan to be amended, they must voice their 
objections at the general meeting and hope that the debtor will be forced to make the modifications in order to 
gain a sufficient number of votes for acceptance. 
 224. Lei No. 11.101, art. 56, pará. 3. 
 225. Id. art. 45. Note that the approval of a debt restructuring plan does not include a requirement akin to 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule. 
 226. Id. art. 45, pará. 1; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b]. 
 227. Lei No. 11.101, art. 45, pará. 2; see also Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[7][b]. 
 228. Lei No. 11.101, art. 38, pará. único. 
 229. See id. art. 45. 
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trustee, within twenty-four hours before the date specified in the notice of 
convocation, legal documentation proving the authority of such agent.230 
If the creditors do not approve the plan in this manner, the judge may 
nevertheless grant judicial reorganization pursuant to this plan if: (1) it was 
approved by creditors holding over half of the amount of all claims (independent of 
class designation) represented at the meeting; (2) two of the three classes approved 
the final plan (or, if there were only two classes with voting creditors, the approval 
of one such class); (3) the plan was approved by over one-third of the creditors in 
the class that rejected the plan; and (4) the plan does not entail different treatment 
among the creditors of the class that rejected it.231 In this sense, the Brazilian 
Bankruptcy Law imposes its own version of “cramdown,” though the rules and 
voting thresholds differ from those in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and there is no 
observance of the absolute priority rule. If the general meeting of creditors rejects 
the plan and the criteria for a Brazil-style cramdown are not satisfied, the judge 
must declare the debtor bankrupt, thereby converting the reorganization to 
liquidation.232 
Even when a plan is confirmed and goes into effect, the debtor remains under 
court supervision.233 Unlike in the U.S., the insolvency process continues until the 
two-year anniversary of the beginning of the case.234 The purpose of this elongated 
period is for the court to make sure that the debtor lives up to its obligations under 
the plan. During this period, if the debtor defaults on any of its obligations under 
the plan, the court will declare the debtor bankrupt, prompting liquidation.235 
 
 
 
 230. Id. art. 37, pará. 4. 
 231. Id. arts. 45, 58. 
 232. Id. art. 56, pará. 4, art. 73. 
 233. Id. art. 61. 
 234. Id.; see Felsberg, supra note 24, ¶ 16.04[10] (2011) (“The debtor shall continue under judicial 
restructuring until all obligations established in the plan, and also those obligations which become due for up to 
two years after the concession of judicial restructuring, have been performed. During this period, the 
nonperformance of any obligation established in the plan will entail the conversion of the restructuring into 
bankruptcy, in which case the creditors shall have their rights and guarantees reconstituted according to the 
terms originally contracted.”) 
 235. Lei No. 11.101, art. 61. The Independência case is an example of this outcome. After creditors approved 
a debt restructuring plan in 2009, the company missed a coupon payment on September 30, 2010 and was 
declared bankrupt. See, e.g., Lucia Kassai, JBS Said to Bid 268 Million Reais for Independencia Units, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/jbs-said-to-bid-268-million-
reais-for-independencia-units.html (reporting Independencia’s September 2010 default on bond payments). 
The company ceased operations in October 2010. Independência then sought a standstill agreement with its 
bondholders while they tried to negotiate a debt-to-equity conversion. Ultimately, Independência and its 
creditors agreed to a sale of assets. See, e.g., Independencia Creditors Agree to JBS Takeover, REUTERS (May 15, 
2012, 4:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/jbs-independencia-idUSL1E8GFFCU20120515 
(reporting sale). 
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E. Plan Negotiation and Confirmation in Practice 
As a result of Brazil’s fast-track confirmation process, which includes a severe 
penalty for failing to reach consensus, debtors should be motivated to propose a 
plan that is attractive to creditors in order to receive sufficient affirmative votes to 
avoid liquidation. Management should be motivated to save their jobs, and 
equityholders should want to retain the ability to earn back their investment. 
However, for complex cases involving international bonds, this is not necessarily 
the case. 
For example, in the CELPA case, while CELPA entered judicial reorganization, 
its parent company and affiliates did not.236 Therefore, executives were not worried 
about job security because they would continue managing those non-debtor 
operations once the case came to a conclusion. Also, because it was clear that 
equityholders would receive no financial recovery, the owners’ primary motivation 
was to obtain releases from ongoing liabilities related to CELPA. Accordingly, the 
equityholders appeared motivated to get the best deal for CELPA’s acquirer, not its 
creditors. Since the law prevented the creditors from proposing their own plan, 
brinksmanship by the debtor ultimately resulted in the creditors having to choose 
between a 17.5% recovery under the debtor’s plan or prompt liquidation.237 
In theory, creditors should be motivated to vote for the best plan that the debtor 
puts forward because their recoveries will likely be much worse in liquidation than 
reorganization. However, creditors may view their recoveries differently, causing 
some creditors to vote in favor of a plan that others find inadequate. For example, 
local creditors may benefit from tax writeoffs under Brazilian law if they accept 
losses whereas international creditors may not. Under CELPA’s proposal for 
unsecured creditors to receive 17.5% recoveries, some Brazilian financial 
institutions viewed this proposal as 50.5% recoveries after accounting for a tax 
shield of up to 40% of their 82.5% losses.238 It is difficult for creditors to mobilize to 
oppose a plan when they view the same proposal differently. 
Moreover, there may be non-financial motivations for creditors to vote for a 
suboptimal plan, rather than threaten the debtor with liquidation unless the debtor 
 
 236. See, e.g., Denyse Godoy, Rede Energia Advances After Closing Sale of Bankrupt Celpa Unit, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/rede-energia-advances-after-
closing-sale-of-bankrupt-celpa-unit.html (reporting increase in stock price of CELPA’s parent company, Rede 
Energia S.A., after concluding the sale of CELPA to Equatorial Energia S.A.).  
 237. See Declaration of Mauro Chaves de Almeida at ¶ 21, In re Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. – Em 
Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568-scc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2012) (noting transfer of equity interests to 
Equatorial); see also Mario Sergio Lima, Rede Energia Units Given Ultimatum by Brazilian Regulator, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-31/rede-energia-units-
given-ultimatum-by-brazilian-regulator.html (reporting that if CELPA creditors failed to approve Equatorial 
Energia’s takeover bid, the company would be declared bankrupt and the government would auction CELPA’s 
concessions). 
 238. See Brief for Foreign Representative’s Motion for Order Granting Relief in Aid of Foreign Proceeding, 
In re Centrais Elétricas Do Pará S.A.– EM Recuperação Judicial, No. 12-14568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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proposes a plan that provides creditors with more favorable treatment. For 
example, vendors may value future business with the debtor and be more wary of 
pushing too hard in plan negotiations. Political pressure may cause local financial 
institutions to fear government backlash if they threaten liquidation. An acquirer 
may promise certain creditors special favors in the future to convince them to 
accept a suboptimal plan proposal. Furthermore, if local creditors in Brazil are 
more familiar with the concordata process and not the 2005 reform, they may be 
resigned to accepting disappointing recoveries. Finally, some creditors may not 
have the institutional sophistication or risk tolerance for the brinksmanship 
involved with threatening to liquidate the debtor, which requires a substantial 
investment of time and professional fees. The process and outcome of liquidation in 
Brazil is confusing and risky, making creditors wary of making even empty threats 
during plan negotiations. Such lack of clarity is aggravated when the debtor has not 
provided sufficient disclosure, such as a detailed list of its assets and recent monthly 
financial performance.239 Fear of the unknown gives the debtor a substantial 
negotiating advantage when crafting a debt restructuring plan. 
VI. Bondholders’ Access to Information 
When investing in Brazilian corporate bonds issued in the U.S., international 
bondholders likely review a prospectus or offering memorandum that is governed 
by the Securities Act. Although this document is intended to contain all of the facts 
that each investor needs to make an informed decision to invest in the borrower’s 
business, the borrower may nevertheless become insolvent. When this happens, 
these investors may be surprised that Brazilian insolvency law does not require the 
same sort of disclosure that the borrower was required to provide pursuant to the 
Securities Act at the time of issuance. 
A. Disclosure Required Under U.S. Law 
In the U.S., creditors in a chapter 11 case employ a variety of means to collect 
extensive information regarding the debtor’s financial health. The estate-funded 
creditors’ committee and its central role in plan negotiations and plan support, 
monthly reporting requirements, and rules of discovery have led to a culture of 
creditor diligence. In addition, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires that a written 
“disclosure statement,” approved by the court after notice and a hearing, 
accompany any plan of reorganization sent to holders of claims or interests.240 
Whereas the plan of reorganization explains the treatment and resolution of 
creditors’ claims and equity interests, the disclosure statement provides information 
about the debtor and the debtor’s estate so that even non-negotiating parties can 
 
 239. See infra Part VI.B. 
 240. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006); see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 343–45. 
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make informed votes on the plan.241 The disclosure statement is a highly useful tool 
because it typically contains current and detailed information regarding financial 
projections for the company’s operations and conclusions about the company’s 
valuation, including disclosure of reports done by the company’s advisors, 
appraisers, and consultants.242 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires that the disclosure statement contain 
“adequate information,” which is defined as: “information of a kind, and in 
sufficient detail . . . that would enable . . . a hypothetical investor of the relevant 
class to make an informed judgment about the plan.”243 The bankruptcy judge is 
given wide discretion in determining whether the disclosure statement contains 
adequate information, and such decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.244 
However, the Bankruptcy Code does provide some guidelines with respect to this 
issue. For example, in determining the adequacy of information, the court must 
consider “the complexity of the case, the benefit of additional information to 
creditors and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional 
information.”245 In addition, adequate information includes “a discussion of the 
potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the debtor, any successor 
to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims or 
interests in the case.”246 Under the Bankruptcy Code, adequate information does not 
require “information about any other possible or proposed plan,”247 and “[t]he 
court may approve a disclosure statement without a valuation of the debtor or an 
appraisal of the debtor’s assets.”248 Although a valuation of the debtor is thus not 
 
 241. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 242. See Jason Cornell, What Information is Required in a Chapter 11 Disclosure Statement?, DELAWARE 
BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION (June 11, 2009), http://delawarebankruptcy.foxrothschild.com/2009/06/articles/ 
bankruptcy-law-basics/what-information-is-required-in-a-chapter-11-disclosure-statement/. 
 243. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). The Code defines an “investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the 
relevant class” as an “investor having (A) a claim or interest of the relevant class; (B) such a relationship with 
the debtor as the holders of other claims or interests of such class generally have; and (C) such ability to obtain 
such information from sources other than the disclosure required by this section as holders of claims or 
interests in such class generally have.” Id. § 1125(a)(2). In other words, the adequacy of disclosure is measured 
against the typical creditor within a class. Thus, for example, if one creditor within a class is an insider, but other 
members of the class are not, that creditor may not be used as the benchmark against which the adequacy of 
information is measured. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977) (characterizing an insider as an 
“extraordinary” investor who would generally not qualify as an “investor typical of holders of claims or interests 
of the relevant class” under section 1125(a)(2)). 
 244. See H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977) (noting that, in determining the adequacy of information 
in disclosure statements, “[c]ourts will take a practical approach as to what is necessary under the circumstances 
of each case, such as the cost of preparation of the statements, the need for relative speed in solicitation and 
confirmation, and, of course, the need for investor protection . . . [and that] [t]here will be a balancing of 
interests in each case”). 
 245. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. § 1125(b). 
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technically required, it is usually included. The Senate Judiciary Report regarding 
the disclosure provisions of the Bankruptcy Code explains: 
A plan is necessarily predicated on knowledge of the assets and liabilities 
being dealt with an [sic] on factually supported expectations as to the future 
course of the business sufficient to meet the feasibility standard [to confirm 
a plan]. It may thus be necesasry [sic] to provide estimates or judgments for 
that purpose. Yet it remains practicable to describe, in such detail as may be 
relevant and needed, the basis for the plan and the data on which 
supporters of the plan rely.249 
In In re A.C. Williams Co.,250 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio created a frequently-cited list of facts to be disclosed in order to provide 
adequate information.251 This list included: the events which led to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition; a description of the available assets and their value; the 
anticipated future of the company; the source of information stated in the 
disclosure statement; a disclaimer; the present condition of the debtor while in 
chapter 11; the scheduled claims; the estimated return to creditors under a 
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation; the accounting method utilized to produce 
financial information and the name of the accountants responsible for such 
information; the future management of the debtor; the chapter 11 plan or a 
summary thereof; the estimated administrative expenses, including attorneys’ and 
accountants’ fees; the collectability of accounts receivable; financial information, 
data, valuations or projections relevant to the creditors’ decision to accept or reject 
the chapter 11 plan; information relevant to the risks posed to creditors under the 
plan; the actual or projected realizable value from recovery of preferential or 
otherwise voidable transfers; litigation likely to arise in a non-bankruptcy context; 
tax attributes of the debtor; and the relationship of the debtor with affiliates.252 
Inasmuch as they help interested parties make informed decisions and avoid 
fraud, disclosure statements are similar to the Form S-1 filings required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for public companies issuing new securities 
under the Securities Act.253 However, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly preempts 
otherwise applicable law with respect to the issue of adequate information.254 Thus, 
disclosure statements submitted in connection with a plan of reorganization are 
 
 249. S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 120–22 (1978). 
 250. 25 B.R. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). 
 251. Id. at 176. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Compare In re A.C. Williams Co., 25 B.R. 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (listing several facts to be 
considered when determining whether a disclosure statement has satisfied the adequate information 
requirement), with Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (listing pieces of 
information required to be submitted in conjunction with Form S-1 prospectus). 
 254. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). 
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exempt from the disclosure requirements of federal and state securities laws.255 The 
Bankruptcy Code also protects individuals from liability under otherwise applicable 
securities laws who, in good faith, rely on a court-approved disclosure statement in 
soliciting or participating in the offer, issuance, sale, or purchase of a security under 
the plan.256 
Until a court-approved disclosure statement and plan summary are distributed 
to all eligible parties, the plan proponent may not solicit acceptances or rejections of 
the plan.257 Improper solicitation may result in the disqualification of the 
improperly obtained votes,258 in addition to an injunction preventing the party from 
disseminating materials and/or sanctions against the party.259 Furthermore, 
improper solicitation involving an offering of securities could expose the plan 
proponent to liability under federal or state securities laws for disclosure, 
registration, and other violations.260 
B. Disclosure Required Under Brazilian Law 
The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires limited disclosure in connection with the 
filing of a petition for judicial reorganization, as well as upon the debtor’s 
submission of a debt restructuring plan. Further disclosure, however, is left to 
negotiations between the debtor and its creditors. 
First, the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization must be accompanied by 
certain documentation, including: 
 
(1) a statement of the material causes of the debtor’s equity condition 
and the reasons for the economic and financial crisis; 
 
 255. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 408–09 (1977). This exemption is very important because securities laws 
are often implicated in soliciting support for plans of reorganization, which frequently involve an offering of 
securities in exchange for claims or interests. S. REP. NO. 95–989, at 120–22 (1978). If plan solicitors were 
obligated to comply with the very strict disclosure requirements of federal securities law, such offerings could 
become prohibitively expensive. See, e.g., Public Service Co. v. Consol. Utils. & Commc’ns, Inc., 846 F.2d 803, 
808 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Without [section 1125(b)], the court . . . would be required in every case to require a full 
proxy statement or prospectus. . . . The cost of developing a prospectus or proxy statement for a large company 
often runs well over $1 million. That cost would be nearly prohibitive in a bankruptcy reorganization. In 
addition, the information normally required under section 14 [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] may 
simply be unavailable, because of the condition of the debtor. Finally, court supervision of the contents of the 
disclosure statement will protect the public investor from any serious inadequacies in the disclosure 
statement.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, at 227–28 (1977)). 
 256. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e). Without this safe harbor, such individuals could be liable, for example, under the 
antifraud provisions that enforce the securities laws from which subsection (d) excuses compliance. H.R. REP. 
NO. 95–595, at 227–29 (1977). 
 257. Id. § 1125(b). 
 258. Id. § 1126(e). 
 259. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, ¶ 1125.05, at 2. 
 260. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e) (showing that the safe harbor provided in 1125(e) protects 
individuals soliciting acceptances or rejections of a plan from liability under otherwise applicable securities laws 
only if such solicitation was performed in good faith and in reliance on a court-approved disclosure statement). 
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(2) accounting statements for the last three financial years and those 
drawn up especially to support the petition, prepared in strict 
compliance with applicable corporation law and consisting necessarily 
of: (a) the balance sheet, (b) accrued income statement, (c) income 
statement as from the last financial year, (d) management report on cash 
flow and projection thereof; 
(3) full nominal list of creditors, including those under an affirmative 
covenant or covenant to give, stating the address, kind, rating and 
updated amount of the claim, and specifying its origin, the system for 
the respective maturity dates and the accounting records on each 
pending transaction; 
(4) full list of employees, stating the respective functions, salaries, 
indemnities and other amounts to which they are entitled, with the 
corresponding accrual months, and specifying amounts pending 
payment; 
(5) certificate of regular standing of the debtor at the Company Public 
Registry, updated Articles of Incorporation and minutes of appointment 
of current officers; 
(6) list of private assets of the debtor’s controlling partners and officers; 
(7) updated statements of debtor’s bank accounts and of any financial 
investments of any kind, including those in investment funds or on 
stock exchanges, issued by the respective financial institutions; 
(8) certificates of the protest offices in the judicial district of the debtor’s 
domicile or headquarters and branches; and 
(9) list, signed by the debtor, of all legal actions to which he is a party, 
including labor-related suits, with an estimate of the respective amounts 
claimed.261 
 
This documentation is made available to the court, the judicial trustee, and, by 
court authorization, any interested party.262 
Second, the debtor’s debt restructuring plan must be accompanied by certain 
documentation when submitted to the court, including: (1) a detailed description 
of the means of reorganization to be used and a summary thereof, (2) a statement 
of its economic feasibility, and (3) an economic-financial and appraisal report on 
the debtor’s assets, signed by a legally qualified professional or specialized 
company.263 Again, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law does not provide for the 
distribution of this information to interested parties; rather, the judge is merely 
 
 261. Lei No. 11.101 art. 51, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, D.O.U. de 9.2.2005 (Braz.). 
 262. Id. art. 1, pará. 1. 
 263. Id. art. 53. 
 Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law 
436 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
required to publish a notice advising creditors of the receipt of the debt 
restructuring plan and the terms for stating objections to it.264 
Finally, upon granting the debtor’s petition for judicial reorganization, the judge 
will order the debtor to submit monthly statements of accounting throughout the 
judicial reorganization term, on pain of the management’s dismissal.265 These 
accounting reports provide minimal financial information about prior periods and 
without the level of detail and footnotes necessary to understand what progress, if 
any, is being made to turnaround troubled operations. Further, they are not 
intended to be responsive to creditors’ inquiries and do not include financial 
forecasts, liquidation analyses, or valuations. As such, they do not provide the 
information that creditors are accustomed to receiving in U.S. bankruptcy cases. 
C. Lack of Transparency in Brazilian Disclosure 
While the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law requires some disclosure in connection with 
the filing of a petition for judicial reorganization and the submission of a debt 
restructuring plan,266 the information available to creditors may be substantially 
more limited than what would be contained in a disclosure statement distributed 
pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or in SEC filings for a securities issuance. 
International bondholders may be surprised by the lack of a culture of diligence in 
judicial reorganizations. Indeed, creditors may be forced to make important 
decisions without feeling fully informed. One Brazilian practitioner and member of 
the drafting committee for the current law recently noted: “The lack of 
transparency . . . is the most common mistake during proceedings of judicial 
reorganization, especially as this prevents the reconstruction of trust among the 
parties, and between the debtor and the bankruptcy court, while hindering the 
process of negotiation.”267 Reforming Brazilian insolvency law could greatly enhance 
fairness in the negotiation process by arming creditors with the information 
necessary to make informed decisions, thereby enhancing the integrity and 
credibility of the judicial reorganization process. 
One way that the Brazilian restructuring process creates transparency problems 
is by motivating the debtor to withhold information for as long as possible. 
Brinksmanship affords the debtor tactical advantages in negotiations during the 
judicial reorganization process. Judicial reorganizations operate under a strict 180-
day timeline,268 and debtors maintain the exclusive right to file a plan of 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. art. 52. 
 266. See supra Part V.B. 
 267. Paiva, supra note 21, at 55. 
 268. Lei No. 11.101 art. 6, pará. 4; see also Carlos Augusto Behrensdorf Derraik, Bankruptcy Law in Brazil: 
An Overview and Practical Considerations, in BANKRUPTCY LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTH AMERICA: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE SOUTH AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCESS, WORKING WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 
AND DEVELOPING SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES 151, 156 (Michaela Falls ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 586868 
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reorganization throughout.269 Debtors generally maintain exclusive control over the 
flow of pertinent information270 and may obfuscate the financial and operational 
details of the company to foster disorganization among creditors. The lack of a 
committee of unsecured creditors complicates consensus-building among 
unsecured creditors over what constitutes adequate disclosure.271 Regardless of the 
level of information received by the 180th day of the proceeding, the creditors must 
either accept the debtor’s plan or reject it and send the company into bankruptcy.272 
As a result, creditors may be manipulated into accepting an indecipherable or 
otherwise suboptimal plan at the last moment rather than risk an uncertain 
recovery in liquidation.273 
A debtor may also resist transparency with its creditors in order to avoid a 
declaration of bankruptcy and its attendant dire consequences. Even if 
reorganization is impractical and ultimately unachievable, a distressed company’s 
management, directors, and owners may pursue judicial reorganization anyway as a 
delay tactic. Lack of transparency allows the debtor to prolong the negotiation 
process in cases where adequate information would have otherwise prompted 
creditors to swiftly demand a judicial declaration of bankruptcy. Debtors in Brazil 
nearly always prefer reorganization to bankruptcy, and voluntary petitions for 
bankruptcy are extremely rare.274 Fernando César Nimer Moreira da Silva, Professor 
of Law at the University of São Paulo, explains some of the incentives associated 
with reorganization from the debtor’s perspective: 
The debtor prefers reorganization, because the gain from the debt discount 
is greater than the amount it would receive in the case of liquidation. [The 
debtor] ignores losses to creditors when making this decision. The less 
privileged creditors will receive little or nothing, with redistribution of 
benefits to the debtor. . . . The managers of inefficient businesses [i.e., 
 
(noting that “such incredibly short and inflexible time frames make it almost impossible for a court to 
reorganize a major business when the court enforces the law as written”). 
 269. Lei No. 11.101 art. 53; see also FERNANDO CÉSAR NIMER MOREIRA DA SILVA, supra note 140, at 112 
(2009) (allowing creditors to produce alternative plans could help reveal information kept secret by the debtor). 
 270. Lei No. 11.101 art. 64; see also Silva, supra note 269, at 97–98 (noting that the debtor “maintains 
absolute control over the business and the information” for the entire 180-day period of reorganization). 
 271. See supra Part IV.B; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 30 (noting importance of the participation of 
creditors for transparency). 
 272. Lei No. 11.101 art. 6, pará. 4.  
 273. See Silva, supra note 269, at 102–03 (“[The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law] does not always facilitate the 
disclosure of information. The law is severe in defining creditor classes . . . [and] deadlines for presenting a plan 
of reorganization and the legal term of bankruptcy, without leaving discretion for the judge to adjust the 
deadlines and conditions to the case at hand and to avoid the practice of opportunistic behaviors.”). 
 274. Silva, supra note 135, at 189 (“In Brazil, the bankruptcy claim is mostly requested from the creditor 
despite the fact that the debtor can request bankruptcy. The debtor in crisis still carries the stigma of failure or 
collapse. Often in Brazil, the debtor exhausts its assets until there is no feasible solution.”); see also Felsberg & 
Filho, supra note 49, at 286 (“Voluntary bankruptcy filings are very rare in Brazil.”); Silva, supra note 269, at 92 
n.257 (noting that voluntary bankruptcies are much more common in the U.S. than in Brazil).  
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businesses that should be liquidated] always have incentives to require 
reorganization in order to be kept in business during the crisis. They will try 
to use the assets to pay current debts and stay as long as possible away from 
bankruptcy, squandering assets and reducing the possibility of paying a 
higher share of debt.275 
Furthermore, a declaration of bankruptcy prompts a civil liability suit against the 
directors and officers of the insolvent company,276 as well as a criminal 
investigation.277 Until the liability action has been adjudicated, the judge, on his own 
initiative or at the request of an interested party, may freeze the directors’ and 
officers’ personal assets.278 Although the concept of limited liability would appear to 
protect directors and officers in the long run, experts have noted that: 
[W]ithin the current business reality, there exists a system of unlimited 
liability as a general rule [especially with respect to labor and tax 
claims279]. . . . Today in Brazil partners and former partners, managers and 
former managers — including those engaged in activity only to guide the 
company as board members — have been held liable for the total value of 
the company’s labor debts. The situation is so unusual that today even legal 
counsels holding powers of attorney to act on behalf of the partners have 
repeatedly been held liable for the full amount of labor debts of insolvent 
companies.280 
With respect to the potential criminal consequences of a bankruptcy declaration, 
the judicial trustee in bankruptcy has a duty to investigate and submit a report to 
the judge regarding “the causes of the bankruptcy, the debtor’s procedure, before 
and after the decision, and other detailed information regarding the conduct of the 
debtor and of other persons, if any, liable for acts that may typify a crime related to 
the judicial reorganization or the bankruptcy, or any other offense related 
thereto.”281 Upon finding evidence of criminal liability, the trustee must transfer 
 
 275. Silva, supra note 269, at 92. 
 276. Lei No. 11.101 art. 82. 
 277. Id. arts. 22(III)(e), 186. 
 278. Id. art. 82, pará. 2. 
 279. Note that, historically, labor and tax claims have often made up the bulk of an insolvent company’s 
indebtedness in Brazil. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 280. Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Professor of Law, Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo, Panel Discussion at 
Harvard Law School: The End of Limited Liability in Brazil (Jan. 25, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2012/02/related-content/end-of-limited-liability-in-brazil.pdf). But see 
Felsberg & Filho, supra note 49, at 289 (“As a rule of thumb, officers and directors are not personally liable for 
obligations incurred by virtue of administrative acts performed in the normal course of business on behalf of 
the corporation, unless they act recklessly, negligently, incompetently, fraudulently, or beyond the scope of their 
powers . . . .”). 
 281. Lei No. 11.101 arts. 22(III)(e), 186. 
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such information to the Public Attorney’s Office,282 which then must either file a 
criminal suit against the implicated party or open a police investigation.283 Bearing 
in mind these potential consequences, one practitioner has noted: “Clients only opt 
for bankruptcy when the economic activity performed has ceased to be viable or is 
beyond recovery. Even so . . . , we recommend self-declared bankruptcy in 
exceptional cases.”284 By so strongly discouraging bankruptcy, the legal regime may 
prompt debtors to withhold information in order to pursue fruitless negotiations 
with creditors, imposing even greater losses.285 
Creditors’ access to information is further hindered by the procedural hurdles 
associated with requesting additional disclosure. In order to request additional 
disclosure, creditors must petition the court, which is time-consuming and 
expensive.286 Even when a debtor is compelled to provide additional disclosure, the 
debtor may comply only superficially. If the creditors continue to be dissatisfied, 
their only remedy is to repeat the process of petitioning the court, causing further 
costs and delay. The strict deadlines in the fast-paced judicial reorganization 
process287 exacerbate the detrimental effect of having to seek such relief. 
Another way that the Brazilian restructuring process causes transparency 
problems for international bondholders relates to Brazilian accounting and 
corporate governance norms, which are far less sophisticated and stringent than 
their U.S. counterparts. As a result, the information provided tends to be less 
reliable and less useful for analyzing a distressed company’s turnaround potential. 
In recent years, the Brazilian National Congress has taken substantial steps toward 
improving financial and accounting transparency in an effort to make Brazilian 
capital markets more competitive.288 Significantly, all companies were required to 
conform to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2010.289 
However, such changes will take time, and remnants of former norms — which 
have been described as “inimical to the production of high quality accounting 
reports”290 — remain common.291 
 
 282. Id. art. 22, pará. 4. 
 283. Id. art. 187. 
 284. Paiva, supra note 21, at 47. 
 285. See Silva, supra note 269, at 100–01. 
 286. See, e.g., Paiva, supra note 21, at 38 (“Although it is a great step forward in relation to the former 
preventative bankruptcy, the process of judicial reorganization entails a high cost, may be time consuming, and 
still generates a whole series of uncertainties, as the law is relatively new and has been little tested in certain 
aspects . . . .”). 
 287. See supra notes 268, 272 and accompanying text. 
 288. See generally Lúcia Lima Rodrigues et al., The Origins of Modern Accounting in Brazil: Influences Leading 
to the Adoption of IFRS, 24 RES. ACCT. REG. 15 (2012). 
 289. Id. at 15.  
 290. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes & Martin Walker, Asset Revaluations, Future Firm Performance and Firm-
Level Corporate Governance Arrangements: New Evidence from Brazil, 44 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 53, 54 (2012). 
 291. See Rodrigues, supra note 288, at 23 (noting resistance to the new accounting methodology and 
concluding that: “[C]onsidering the increasing global economic and financial integration of Brazil, the 
convergence of national GAAP with IFRS was considered of upmost importance to improve the financial 
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The prior accounting model in Brazil developed amid conditions that “reduce[d] 
the value relevance of published accounting numbers.”292 Because state-operated 
banks accommodated the capital needs of most businesses, accounting and financial 
reporting was not designed to induce outside investment.293 The confluence of tax 
and financial accounting,294 as well as a lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms,295 
also contributed to the diminished quality of such reports. Alexsandro Broedel 
Lopes, an accounting professor at the University of São Paulo, describes the 
transition to the IFRS accounting model as a “major revolution,” noting: 
 
reporting of Brazilian corporations. . . . However, it is expected that the acceptance of the new paradigm . . . will 
take time, its assimilation will require ‘the reconstruction of prior theory and the revaluation of prior fact, an 
intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom complete[d] by a single man and never overnight.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). For example, a 2012 study on Brazilian businesses’ cost of capital in relation to their use of 
derivatives points out the continuing dearth of disclosure, finding that: “[T]he overriding takeaway is criticism 
of the lack of data in the Brazilian market, mainly in terms of the level of disclosure of information in 
companies’ balance sheets and explanatory notes . . . . In addition, no systematic procedure to register company 
information about dividend policy and credit rating also reduced the sample size.” João Ricardo Ribeiro 
Coutinho et al., The Use of Fx Derivatives and the Cost of Capital: Evidence of Brazilian Companies, 13 EMERGING 
MARKETS REV. 411, 420 (2012). 
 292. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes, Teaching IFRS in Brazil: News on the Front, 20 ACCT. EDUC. 339, 341 (2011); 
see also, e.g., Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Brazil, 11 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 21, 37 (2010) 
(“Financial disclosure lags behind world standards. Brazilian accounting standard[s] do not require either a 
statement of cash flows or quarterly consolidated financial statements, and only a minority of firms provide 
these, generally in connection with a listing on Bovespa Level 1 or higher, or cross-listing on a foreign 
exchange.”). 
 293. Lopes, supra note 292, at 340–41 (explaining Brazil’s “bank-oriented (as opposed to market-oriented) 
financial system” and concluding that “[d]espite the fact that some accounting rules in Brazil were influenced 
by American standards . . . , the whole of its accounting infrastructure was not based on the production of 
information for capital markets.”); see also World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Brazil 
Accounting and Auditing, ¶¶ 8, 9 (created June 20, 2005, published Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_bra.pdf [hereinafter World Bank]. 
 294. Under the former accounting model, Brazilian companies often did not distinguish between reporting 
for tax purposes versus financial purposes. Lopes, supra note 292, at 342. Alexsandro Broedel Lopes, an 
accounting professor at the University of São Paulo, explains: “In Brazil, accounting was basically seen as a tool 
to calculate taxes and not as an instrument to reduce information asymmetry between investors and firms. The 
whole subject of disclosures including how to prepare footnotes, for instance, despite being demanded by the 
Law, were not even taught at universities on accounting courses. . . . Fair value was so distant a concept that 
most accountants in Brazil used to say that measuring fair value was a step towards other professions’ domains 
(e.g. that of economists).” Id. at 344. The problem with failing to separate the realms of tax and finance when 
reporting information about a company, Lopes explains, is that “value relevance is lower when tax rules 
significantly influence the financial reporting process, consistent with the assumption that tax rules are 
influenced by political and economic determinants rather than the needs of equity investors.” Id. at 342. 
 295. World Bank, supra note 293, at ¶¶ 50–61; see also Christopher W. Anderson, Financial Contracting 
Under Extreme Uncertainty: An Analysis of Brazilian Corporate Debentures, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 45, 54 (1999) 
(“[T]he quality of disclosure by Brazilian firms is perceived to be low. South American accounting practices are 
dominated by the legal and administrative systems inherited from the Iberian colonizers and the highly political 
environment that results from such systems. Brazilian annual reports, for example, are used with little 
effectiveness by corporations that usually comply merely with their legal obligations. Indeed, for the vast 
majority of firms, financial statements do not correspond to the reality of their operations and the manipulation 
of financial statements is not restricted to small firms. . . . [A]ncillary disclosure institutions are weak. For 
example, auditors’ reports are of little prominence in the relationship between a corporation and its 
shareholders . . . .”) (internal quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted).  
 Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods 
Vol. 8, No. 2 2013 441 
The new rules require[] a new kind of professional very distinct from the 
traditional record keeper. . . . The situation and the challenges in Brazil are 
not really about the adoption or not of IFRS per se. The main challenges 
arise with the adoption of an accounting model designed to inform external 
users and based on judgment, and on the economic substance of 
transactions, in contrast to the local model, which was designed to attain 
other ends. . . . The future holds many challenges for the construction of a 
high quality accounting system in Brazil.296 
Moreover, studies indicate that the adoption of IFRS, in and of itself, does not 
necessarily lead to higher quality in financial and accounting reporting.297 Rather, 
increased corporate transparency is the result of “a country’s investor protection 
regime” as a whole, which can be strengthened through “board independence, 
enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholder rights, 
enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, judicial independence, and 
freedom of the press.”298 In this respect, while Brazilian corporate governance norms 
are also in a state of rapid change, chronic weaknesses persist.299 For example, 
Brazilian law does not require director independence.300 For these reasons, 
information that creditors receive from a Brazilian company in judicial 
reorganization may be less reliable than what they would receive from a company 
reorganizing under chapter 11 in the U.S. 
VII. Distressed Asset Sales 
One of the sharpest differences between the insolvency processes in Brazil and the 
U.S. relates to asset sales. International investors may be surprised by the lack of 
protections for bondholders, who have very limited influence over the asset sale 
process. When an insolvent company’s assets are sold as part of a judicial 
reorganization, bondholders may find themselves at an unfortunate procedural and 
informational disadvantage, as occurred in the CELPA and Independência cases. 
A. Distressed Asset Sales Under U.S. Law 
Section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs the use, sale, or lease of a debtor’s 
property in a bankruptcy case outside the ordinary course of the debtor’s 
 
 296. Lopes, supra note 292, at 346. 
 297. Muhammad Nurul Houqe et al., The Effect of IFRS Adoption and Investor Protection on Earnings Quality 
Around the World, 47 INT’L J. ACCT. 333 (2012). 
 298. Id. at 337. 
 299. Black, supra note 292, at 37. 
 300. Id. (“Board independence is an area of notable weakness: the boards of most Brazilian private firms are 
comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many 
firms have zero independent directors.”). 
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business.301 When the debtor seeks to sell a business unit, production facility, or the 
entire company, the bankruptcy court provides substantial oversight of the sale, the 
process is transparent, and creditors have multiple opportunities to object to the 
way the debtor proposes to conduct the sale. Section 363 was designed to obtain the 
highest and best offer for the assets being sold,302 which is consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code’s general goal of providing fair and equitable recoveries to 
creditors. As a result, a sale of a company under section 363 may prove to be a 
superior alternative to a standalone plan of reorganization. 
Congress structured the 363 sale process to attract potential buyers who might 
otherwise shun asset sales involving insolvent entities. A powerful incentive is that 
the bankruptcy court has the power to authorize the sale of assets free and clear of 
liens or other encumbrances.303 Thus, a buyer may use the bankruptcy court’s order 
approving a sale as a valid and practically impenetrable defense to any later 
attempts by the debtor’s creditors to assert claims against the assets sold to the 
buyer. Except in limited circumstances,304 all liabilities remain with the bankruptcy 
estate and the cash received from the sale. Furthermore, while any party in interest 
may appeal a bankruptcy court order approving a sale, the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that reversal or modification of the order on appeal “does not affect the 
 
 301. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006); see id. § 363(c) (stating that, unless the bankruptcy court orders otherwise, 
the trustee or debtor in possession may use, sell, or lease property of the bankruptcy estate in the ordinary 
course of business without need for a notice or hearing); NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377–80. 
 302. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377. 
 303. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (permitting sale debtor’s assets free and clear of any other interests in the 
property). In order to sell (or lease) encumbered assets free and clear of all claims and interests, the bankruptcy 
trustee or debtor in possession must prove at least one of the following conditions to the bankruptcy court:  
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest;  
(2) such entity consents;  
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the 
aggregate value of all liens on such property;  
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or  
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money 
satisfaction of such interest.  
Id. 
 304. Examples of potential successor liability might be an environmental claim that was not discovered until 
after the bankruptcy, or a product liability claim in which the cause of action arose after the date of sale. See 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.06[7] (“It seems clear that creditors whose claims accrued 
before or during the bankruptcy case and who had an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy case are 
bound by any plan or distribution in that case. With regard to future claimants, such as product liability 
claimants whose claims do not arise until after confirmation of a plan, the claims may not be discharged under 
section 1141. If the debtor’s assets have been liquidated, such claimants may seek to recover from a purchaser of 
the debtor’s assets. Courts have sought to provide protection to purchasers of assets, who might otherwise be 
subject to such claims under principles of successor liability, by approving sales free of all present or future 
claims against the debtor or the estate. . . . However, the bankruptcy court’s ability to override principles of 
successor liability in bankruptcy sales has been questioned. . . .”). 
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validity of a sale,” unless the sale order was stayed pending appeal.305 As a result of 
these protections, buyers can bid their highest price without having to discount for 
potential liabilities, which may be subjective and difficult to calculate. 
A 363 sale typically involves an auction or other competitive bidding process, 
unless there are highly unusual circumstances justifying an expedited sale to a sole 
bidder.306 The bankruptcy court will focus mainly on the validity and integrity of the 
sale process, rather than the ultimate valuation. While soliciting potential bidders, 
running the auction, and determining a winning bidder are conducted by the 
debtor in possession and its advisors outside of the bankruptcy court, the overall 
sale process is governed by the official bidding procedures approved by the 
bankruptcy judge.307 When a debtor in possession proposes selling assets, the 
bankruptcy judge has the discretion to determine whether a 363 sale is appropriate 
and considers objections by creditors.308 
A typical 363 sale involves the following steps: (i) the debtor selects an initial 
bidder, known as a “stalking horse,”309 (ii) the debtor and stalking horse negotiate 
an asset purchase agreement that becomes the benchmark against which other 
potential buyers bid during the formal auction process,310 (iii) the debtor files a 363 
motion with the bankruptcy court to request approval of the bidding procedures,311 
(iv) upon approval, the debtor provides notice of the proposed sale to all parties in 
interest, which must include a description of the property to be sold, the time and 
place of sale, and the deadlines for filing objections,312 (v) the debtor conducts the 
auction,313 (vi) the debtor determines a winning bidder and files a motion with the 
 
 305. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). Recently, however, some courts have held that some aspects of a sale order may be 
undone on appeal, even absent a stay. See, e.g., In re PW, LLC, 391 B.R. 25, 29–30 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e 
reject the contention that once the sale is consummated, the appeal from the order stripping the junior 
creditor’s liens is moot and immune from scrutiny . . . .”). 
 306. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02 (discussing the standard for approval of a sale); 
see also NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 377. 
 307. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET 
AL., supra note 118, at 378. 
 308. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02. 
 309. The purpose of a stalking horse bid is to allow the debtor to test the market and set a floor on price at 
the formal court auction, thereby preventing low-ball offers. In exchange for an early bid, the debtor can offer 
the stalking horse several advantages, including break-up fees, expense reimbursement, minimum increments 
for overbids, and qualification requirements and strict deadlines for competing bidders. COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 388–89. In addition, the stalking 
horse may have more time and greater access to conduct due diligence on the distressed entity than subsequent 
bidders. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 389. 
 310. The debtor may make customary representations and warranties in the APA, but they typically do not 
survive closing. Id. at 386. Furthermore, typically the bidding procedures approved by the bankruptcy court do 
not allow bids to include due diligence, financing, or other contingencies. Id. Therefore, it is critical that all 
bidders complete due diligence and raise sufficient capital prior to submitting their bids. Id. 
 311. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 381. 
 312. FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 6004(a) (requiring notice of the proposed use, sale, or lease of property not in the 
ordinary course of business); FED. R. BANKR. P. R. 2002 (detailing rules of such notice); see also In re Condere 
Corp., 228 B.R. 615, 624–25 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998) (describing the applicability of these rules to §363 sales).  
 313. NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 381. 
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court to approve the sale,314 (vii) the court approves the sale,315 and (viii) the sale 
closes.316 
In considering whether to approve a 363 sale, courts generally consider four 
factors: “whether the proposed 363 sale reflects: (i) a sound business reason, (ii) 
accurate and reasonable notice, (iii) adequate price, and (iv) good faith.”317 In 
addition, the court will be on alert as to whether the 363 sale process is really a de 
facto plan of reorganization because the process runs the risk of rendering certain 
rights of creditors meaningless.318 When a debtor requests a 363 sale, it is effectively 
asking the court to waive the usual disclosure, consent solicitation, voting, and 
confirmation process involved in a traditional plan of reorganization. Further, a 363 
sale is protected from extensive judicial review by the business judgment rule,319 
whereas a plan of reorganization involves a judicial determination that the plan 
meets the statutory confirmation standards.320 As a result, some courts will not 
approve a 363 sale that is tantamount to a plan of reorganization.321 
Other provisions of section 363 further serve to protect the integrity of the sale 
process and promote the goal of obtaining the highest and best bid. Section 363(n) 
is meant to prevent collusion among bidders.322 Section 363(k) authorizes a secured 
creditor to submit a bid using some or all of its secured claim (a so-called “credit 
bid”) to protect against its collateral being sold for too low a price.323 Section 363(e) 
allows secured creditors to demand adequate protection if their collateral is the 
object of the sale.324 
Notably, although all creditors have a right to object to the bidding procedures 
involved in a 363 sale, the Bankruptcy Code reserves the right to propose a 363 sale 
to the debtor in possession (or the bankruptcy trustee, as the case may be).325 If 
creditors want to encourage a sale of the company, they usually must wait until the 
 
 314. Id. (noting that the court must approve the winning bid). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 387. 
 317. Id. at 385–86; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02. 
 318. However, section 363 also provides certain protections for creditors who have a claim on the asset(s) 
being sold. For example, upon request by a party in interest, the trustee must provide adequate protection of 
that interest in the property when seeking to use, sell, or lease the property. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006). 
 319. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at ¶ 363.02; NESVOLD ET AL., supra note 118, at 384. 
 320. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.  
 321. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939–40 (5th
 
Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he debtor and the 
Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a 
reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets”).  
 322. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (“The trustee may avoid a sale . . . if the sale price was controlled by an 
agreement among potential bidders . . . .”). 
 323. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). 
 324. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in the property . . . 
sold . . . or proposed to be sold . . . by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or 
condition such . . . sale . . . as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.”). 
 325. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (“The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in 
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate . . . .”); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 73, at 
¶ 363.02 (discussing the function of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)). 
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debtor loses exclusivity, at which time the creditors can propose their own plan that 
involves a sale of the company. Depending upon the debtor’s circumstances, there 
may be other ways that creditors are able to influence a sale as opposed to a 
standalone plan of reorganization.326 
B. Distressed Asset Sales Under Brazilian Law 
The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law explicitly recognizes spin-offs, mergers, changes of 
control, partial sales of assets, and other similar transactions as appropriate means 
of judicial reorganization.327 It also attempts to encourage a meaningful market for 
the sale of assets in an insolvency proceeding by providing that the acquirer will not 
succeed to any of the debtor’s obligations, including tax and labor-related debts.328 
In addition, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law expressly favors the sale of an entire 
business, as opposed to the piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets, so as to preserve 
the social and economic value of the unfragmented enterprise.329 The Brazilian sale 
process, however, is far less transparent to creditors than the 363 sale procedure 
conducted in the United States. International bondholders expecting a process 
similar to a 363 sale will likely face unwelcome surprises. 
Brazilian debtors under judicial reorganization may accomplish an asset sale in 
one of two ways: (1) by including the sale as a means of reorganization in its debt 
restructuring plan330 or (2) by requesting judicial authorization of the sale.331 In the 
 
 326. For example, in the chapter 11 case of In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
29, 2011), the labor unions and creditors of AMR Corp.’s American Airlines operations helped persuade the 
debtor to agree to merge with USAirways Group Inc., despite management’s intent to file a standalone plan of 
reorganization. See David Koenig, American, US Airways Announce $11 Billion Merger, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 
14, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20130214/WIRE/130219891 (“[C]reditors 
forced AMR’s management to consider the value of a merger compared with a plan for the independent 
American. Eventually they concluded that the best return for stakeholders, and the best chance to compete with 
bigger rivals United Airlines and Delta Air Lines, came from a merger.”); Sheryl Jean, Union-driven American 
Airlines-US Airways Merger Stands Out in Industry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 14, 2003, 10:47 PM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/20130214-union-driven-american-airlines-us-airways-
merger-stands-out-in-industry.ece. 
 327. Lei No. 11.101, art. 50, de 9 de Fevereiro de 2005, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 9.2.2005 
(Braz.). 
 328. Id. arts. 60, 141(II); see also Lei No. 5.172, art. 133, de 25 de Outubro de 1966, CÓDIGO TRIBUTÁRIO 
NACIONAL [C.T.N.] de 25.10.1966 (Braz.); Paiva, supra note 21, at 50 (“Legislative history supports the 
proposition of the conscientious option of incorporating the concept of free and clear sales into the revised 
insolvency legislation as a mechanism to facilitate the maximization of value of a debtor’s assets.”). 
 329. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 135, at 195 (“The business should be preserved whenever possible due to its 
social function that generates economic wealth and creates jobs opportunities and income. This contributes to 
growth and social development of the country. In addition, the liquidation of the business causes economic loss 
represented by intangible assets such as name, business location, reputation, brands, customers, suppliers 
network, expertise, training, prospect of future earnings, among others.”). 
 330. Lei No. 11.101, art. 60. 
 331. Id. art. 142; see also id. art. 66 (“Once the petition for judicial reorganization has been distributed, the 
debtor cannot dispose of or encumber any items or rights of his permanent assets, unless they are of evident 
utility recognized by the judge after hearing the committee, with the exception of those previously listed in the 
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latter case, the debtor must demonstrate the “evident utility” of the proposed sale.332 
In either case, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law provides that the judge should order 
the sale to be conducted either through auction by oral bidding, sealed bidding, or 
“public proclamation” (a combination of the two).333 The debtor must accept the 
highest bid offered.334 Creditors may file an opposition within forty-eight hours of 
the auction.335 The sale must be preceded by public notice in a “widely circulated 
newspaper” thirty days in advance of the proceeding.336 However, the judge can 
authorize a different modality of disposal if so requested by the judicial trustee or 
creditors committee337 or if provided for under the plan.338 For example, a judge may 
authorize a private sale, which would likely involve a stalking horse bidder.339 
In practice, there are many problems with permitting debtors to include a sale 
proposal as part of the debt restructuring plan. Because the debtor holds the 
exclusive right to file a plan340 and creditors are rarely able to act in an organized 
manner,341 debtors hold too much control over the sale process. The debtor enjoys 
broad discretion over which potential acquirers can bid and how the winning bid is 
determined. Overall, the debtor can avoid including competitive bidding 
procedures that would be more likely to bring a higher sale price, even if the 
debtor’s motivations are pure. The lack of transparency undermines trust, at best, 
and invites corruption, at worst. 
Moreover, the lack of transparency in the sale process is exacerbated by 
brinksmanship in the voting process.342 The debtor may decide to sell the company 
at the outset, but run down the clock in the voting process toward the 180th day to 
avoid having to make concessions in negotiations. Since creditors have little input 
in the sale process and cannot file a competing plan, there is rarely an opportunity 
for creditors to insist upon an auction or other market test of the sale transaction 
proposed by the debtor. Presumably, if creditors do not approve of the sale 
proposal, then they will vote against the plan. However, rather than risk liquidation, 
disgruntled creditors may feel compelled to vote for the plan even if they feel it is 
 
judicial reorganization plan.”); id. art. 140 (“Asset realization shall start independently of formation of the 
general list of creditors.”). 
 332. Id. art. 66; see also Paiva, supra note 21, at 51 (“[The debtor] is generally prohibited from selling or 
encumbering any of its permanent assets (except with a prior approval of the courts, any creditors’ committee, 
or the trustee), unless the sale is established in the reorganization plan. Generally, the sale will be approved by 
the court if and when the need and utility of the proposed sale is properly demonstrated.”). 
 333. Lei No. 11.101, art. 142. 
 334. Id. art. 142, pará. 2. 
 335. Id. art. 143.  
 336. Id. art. 142, pará. 1; see also id. art. 129 (permitting revocation suit for any sale of assets effectuated 
without notice if debtor is ultimately liquidated and its assets are insufficient to settle remaining liabilities). 
 337. Id. art. 144. 
 338. Id. art. 145. 
 339. Paiva, supra note 21, at 52. 
 340. See supra Part V.B. 
 341. See supra Part IV.B. 
 342. See supra Part VI.C. 
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unfair. Once a creditor votes to approve the plan, including the sale, that creditor 
might be concerned that a subsequent objection to the sale process would appear 
inconsistent. 
While it is theoretically possible for creditors to attempt to attract alternative 
buyers or pursue their own brinksmanship strategy by threatening to vote against 
the debtor’s plan unless the debtor chooses a superior bid or elects a more 
competitive sale process, there are many practical challenges to such approaches. 
Without an organized committee of creditors,343 individual creditors may be wary of 
investing their own resources to oppose the debtor’s sale or to attract interest in the 
sale from other potential bidders. 
Furthermore, once a debtor has chosen its favored buyer, interest among other 
potential buyers will likely be chilled. Other potential bidders know that the debtor 
has the exclusive right to propose a plan and therefore elect the winning bidder, 
without necessarily having input from creditors or the court. The lack of up-to-date 
information about the debtor’s finances and operations puts other interested buyers 
at a competitive disadvantage. Without access to the company to perform the same 
due diligence as the buyer selected by the debtor, other interested buyers would not 
have the information necessary to formulate a competing bid. In addition, the 
favored buyer may be able to negotiate side deals with local creditors to gain their 
approval even if the bid undervalues the company. For example, a buyer may 
promise future business. A buyer with ties to labor groups may be able to garner the 
labor class’s support as part of a broader deal. A buyer might make political 
donations to win the favor of regulators and other political figures. In Brazil’s tight-
knit business community, international bondholders are at a serious disadvantage. 
Likewise, the creditors themselves are at a disadvantage in evaluating the 
proposed purchase price or in submitting their own competing bid. In submitting 
their own bid, creditors face obstacles in gaining consensus without the aid of a 
formal committee, and there is often unwillingness to commit additional capital 
after an initial investment has soured. Other obstacles include Brazilian laws 
surrounding equity ownership of banks in companies and debt investors’ lack of 
management experience. 
C. Distressed Asset Sales in Practice in Brazil 
The judicial reorganization of Brazilian airline Varig, S.A. and its affiliates Rio-Sul 
Linhas Aereas S.A. and Nordeste Linhas Aereas S.A.344 exemplifies a consensual asset 
sale process proposed by the debtors and agreed by the creditors. In December 
2005, Varig’s creditors approved a split of the company into two segments: (1) 
VarigLog, which was purchased by Volo do Brasil, an investment consortium, and 
 
 343. See supra Part IV.B. 
 344. In re Varig, S.A., No. 05-14400 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2005). 
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reestablished as Varig Logística S.A., and (2) “new” Varig, which became the 
reorganized company. When the reorganized company’s performance continued to 
decline, Varig’s creditors approved an amendment to the debt restructuring plan to 
pursue a sale of the remaining assets via auction.345 The debtor then ran a 
competitive bidding process with NV Participações Ltda., a new company 
established by former Varig employees, prevailing.346 When the employees could not 
finance their bid, the court declared the bid void and authorized the debtor to re-
auction the assets.347 Varig Logística was the sole bidder at the second auction.348 The 
court ultimately declared the sale complete in December 2006, thereby reuniting the 
businesses.349 In March 2007, Volo do Brasil sold VarigLog to Gol Transportes 
Aéreos, another airline.350 
While the Varig case followed a process similar to a 363 sale, CELPA’s case 
illustrates the marked differences between the U.S. and Brazil regarding asset sales 
in an insolvency proceeding. After initiating judicial reorganization, CELPA 
announced that it would transfer its assets to Equatorial Energia S.A. (Equatorial), a 
Brazil-based holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in the generation and 
distribution of electricity.351 Subsequently, CELPA’s debt restructuring plan 
involved a sale of all of its debt and equity interests to Equatorial, such that all 
distributions to creditors would come from cash received from Equatorial.352 As 
such, the plan became a three-way negotiation among the debtor, the creditors, and 
Equatorial, as the debtor believed it could not concede to any creditor demands 
without the approval of Equatorial. 
CELPA did not conduct an auction for this sale and did not propose bidding 
procedures to the court.353 Dissatisfied creditors faced several hurdles in objecting to 
the sale process, including the lack of an official creditors’ committee to mobilize 
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the voices of various creditors, inadequate financial disclosure to determine 
whether Equatorial’s bid reflected a reasonable valuation for CELPA’s assets, the 
debtor’s exclusive right to propose a plan, and the absence of sufficient judicial 
oversight of the asset sale process. The only way for creditors to object to the sale 
process was to vote against the plan and demand that it be revised to include a 
bidding process open to other potential acquirers.354 However, organizing a 
sufficient number of opposing votes among creditors proved to be too much of a 
challenge. Ultimately, the creditors voted to approve CELPA’s plan proposing a sale 
to Equatorial rather than face liquidation.355 
In Independência’s case, bondholders felt that the debtor’s proposed plan 
offered such a patently unfair recovery that they decided to commit new capital to 
provide the secured exit financing instead of accepting the plan.356 Even though 
these bondholders lacked sufficient financial and operational information about 
Independência, they believed that the company’s valuation had to be higher than 
the debtor proposed. Under Brazilian law, they could not compel the debtor to 
reveal additional information so that they could become comfortable with the 
discounts contained in the debtor’s proposed plan.357 Rather than face liquidation, 
the debtor acquiesced to the bondholders’ proposal.358 Within a year of financing 
the acquisition of Independência’s assets, the company’s financial distress 
resurfaced and the company defaulted on its new financing from the 
bondholders.359 Since a judicial reorganization does not close upon the confirmation 
date of a debt restructuring plan and, instead, remains under court supervision 
until the second anniversary of the insolvency petition, Independência returned to 
judicial reorganization.360 Within the next year, the company ceased operations and 
proceeded to liquidate.361 In hindsight, bondholders invested additional capital into 
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Independência and ultimately received less than they would have under the debtor’s 
initial plan.362 
VIII. Conclusion 
The point of this Article is not that the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law should become 
identical to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the point is to encourage further 
reform of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law to address issues having a pronounced 
adverse effect on international bondholders. While the 2005 reform made 
significant improvements for many creditors, such as Brazilian banks, vendors, and 
employees, the reform did not address the distinct issues arising when a debtor has 
issued bonds to international investors. Specifically, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law 
should recognize the standing and voting rights of individual bondholders.363 This 
critical first step would at least provide international bondholders with a seat at the 
negotiating table when their investment in Brazilian corporate bonds becomes 
distressed, without having to go through the time-consuming and expensive 
distraction of claim separation. The Brazilian Bankruptcy Law should also provide 
an adequate mechanism for unsecured creditors to organize separately from other 
creditors and receive reimbursement for the reasonable fees and expenses of their 
advisors.364 In addition, the law can restore the balance of power in plan 
negotiations by authorizing creditors to file competing plans of reorganization at, 
for example, the last day of the judicial reorganization.365 By allowing creditors to 
cast their votes among plan alternatives, the process would become more 
democratic. Moreover, in a Brazilian insolvency procedure, all creditors should 
enjoy the same level of disclosure with which a bond issuer must comply when 
issuing securities under the Securities Act.366 Furthermore, when the debtor seeks to 
sell its business to a third party acquirer, the law should compel review by the court 
and creditors or require a market test like an auction.367 As currently enacted, these 
combined pitfalls in Brazilian law create an unfavorable environment for 
international bondholders. Rather than reliably establishing a transparent process 
that results in a fair and equitable outcome, the current law can result in 
unbalanced negotiations slanted by brinksmanship. Reform in these areas will be 
critical if Brazil wants to continue raising capital from U.S. markets and elsewhere. 
Without such further reform, Brazil risks the same high interest rates and limited 
access to capital that motivated Brazil to overhaul the antiquated concordata 
process. 
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